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Legality in Contemporary Chinese Politics
Taisu Zhang
Tom Ginsburg *

Forthcoming, Virginia Journal of International Law.

Abstract
The picture of Chinese law that many Western scholars and commentators portray is an
increasingly bleak one: since the mid-2000s, China has been retreating from legal reform back into
unchecked authoritarianism. This article argues that, much to the contrary, Chinese politics have
in fact become substantially more law-oriented over the past five years. The Chinese Communist
Party under Xi Jinping has indeed centralized power and control to an almost unprecedented extent,
but it has done this in a highly legalistic way, empowering courts against other state and Party
entities, insisting on legal professionalism, and bringing political powers that were formerly the
exclusive possession of the Party under legal authorization and regulation. In fact, nowhere is this
“legalism” more powerfully expressed than in the 2018 amendments to the Chinese Constitution,
which show that, even if China is indeed deepening its dictatorship, it is nonetheless doing so
through harnessing the organizational and legitimizing capacities of law, rather than circumventing
it.
We argue that both top-down political considerations and bottom-up social demand are driving
this recent turn towards legality: first, as a purely instrumental matter, governing China in a
centralized, top-down manner requires a strong commitment to bureaucratic legalization. The
sheer size of the country and its population creates severe principal-agent and resource allocation
problems that force central authorities to either recognize some version of de-facto federalism, or
to combat local corruption and abuse through rigorous law enforcement. With the recent political
turn away from decentralized administration, the Party leadership must pursue the latter strategy
of investing in legality. Second, and perhaps more interestingly, the Chinese population
increasingly seems to attach significant amounts of sociopolitical legitimacy to law and legality.
As a result, empowering legal institutions and positioning the Party leadership as a champion of
legality against traditional bureaucratic corruption has been a major source of both personal status
and popular political legitimacy.
*
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Introduction
The picture of Chinese law that Western scholars and commentators portray is often an
increasingly bleak one: since the mid-2000s, China has been retreating from political and legal
reform, back into unchecked authoritarianism and dictatorship. 1 With this retreat, law and formal
governmental institutions are increasingly subordinated to the control of Chinese Communist Party
(CCP) leaders, rendering them politically insignificant. Correspondingly, whatever glimmer of
1

Recent scholarly writings that strike a distinctly pessimistic tone include: CARL MINZNER, END OF AN ERA: HOW
CHINA'S AUTHORITARIAN REVIVAL IS UNDERMINING ITS RISE (2018) [hereinafter MINZNER, END OF AN ERA], Carl
Minzner, China’s Turn Against Law, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 936 (2011) [hereinafter Minzner, Turn Against Law]; Carl
Minzner, Legal Reform in the Xi Jinping Era, 20 ASIA POL. 4, 4 (2015) [hereinafter Minzner, Legal Reform] (noting
that “liberal reforms remain off the table”); Zhang Qianfan, Judicial Reform in China, An Overview, in CHINA’S
SOCIALIST RULE OF LAW REFORMS UNDER XI JINPING (John Garrick and Yan Chang Barrett, eds. 2016) (arguing
that there was a turn against legality under Hu Jintao, and expressing pessimism that it can be effectively reversed
under Xi Jinping); Suisheng Zhao, Xi Jinping’s Maoist Revival, 27 J. DEMOCRACY 83, 92-96 (2016); Susan Shirk,
The Return to Personalistic Rule, 29 J. DEM. 22 (2018); STEN RINGEN, THE PERFECT DICTATORSHIP: CHINA IN THE
21ST CENTURY (2018). EVA PILS, HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHINA: A SOCIAL PRACTICE IN THE SHADOWS OF
AUTHORITARIANISM (2017); Donald C. Clarke, China’s Legal System and the Fourth Plenum, 20 ASIA POL’Y 10
(2015), available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2631042 (expressing pessimism at the prospects of post-2014 Chinese
legal reform); Jerome Cohen, A Looming Crisis for China’s Legal System, FOREIGN POL’Y (Feb. 22, 2016, 10:15
AM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/02/22/a-looming-crisis-for-chinas-legal-system/; Stanley Lubman, After
Crackdown on Rights Lawyers, China’s Legal Reform Path Uncertain, WALL ST. J.: CHINA REAL TIME REP. (July
31, 2015, 10:26 AM), https://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2015/07/31/after-crackdown-on-rights-lawyers-chinaslegal-reform-path-uncertain/ [hereinafter Lubman, After Crackdown Reform Path Uncertain]. Minzner’s article on
China’s purported “turn against law,” supra, which makes the strongest case that Chinese legal reform has regressed
since 2008, is the single most cited and influential article on Chinese law over the past decade. His arguments echo
an earlier body of literature that criticized pre-2008 Chinese legal reform as underdeveloped and contaminated by
Party control and administrative interference at every level. See, e.g., STANLEY LUBMAN, BIRD IN A CAGE: LEGAL
REFORM IN CHINA AFTER MAO (2000) [hereinafter LUBMAN, BIRD IN A CAGE]; Benjamin L. Liebman, China’s
Courts: Restricted Reform, 191 CHINA Q. 620 (2008) [hereinafter Liebman, Restricted Reform]; Fu Hualing &
Richard Cullen, From Mediatory to Adjudicatory Justice: The Limits of Civil Justice Reform in China, in CHINESE
JUSTICE, CIVIL DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN CHINA 78 (Margaret Y.K. Woo & Mary E. Gallagher eds., Cambridge
University Press, 2011) (discussing events and structural limitations that foreshadowed the “turn against law”);
Susan Finder, The Supreme People 's Court of the People's Republic of China, 7 J. CHINESE L. 145 (1993). Randall
Peerenboom has attempted to push back against this kind of pessimism, The Battle Over Legal Reforms in China:
Has There Been a Turn Against Law?, (August 12, 2014), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2479716 or
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2479716 (arguing that Chinese legal reform continues to progress at a steady pace),
but his tempered optimism has been far less influential than the pessimism he argues against. Some other accounts
seek to balance the two sides in various ways. See Benjamin L. Liebman, China’s Law-Stability Paradox, 143
DAEDALUS 96 (2014) [hereinafter Liebman, Law-Stability Paradox] (acknowledging the swing away from law
under Hu Jintao, but suggesting that it may be temporary); Fu Hualing, Building Judicial Integrity in China, 39
Hastings Int’l Comp. L. Rev. 167 (2016) (offering a more positive assessment of Chinese legal reform, tempered
with warnings about the ongoing dominance of Party politics over legality); Jacques deLisle, Law in the China
Model 2.0: Legality, Developmentalism and Leninism under Xi Jinping, 26 J. CONTEMP. CHINA 68 (2017) (arguing
that the role of law in Chinese governance remains “narrowly instrumentalist,” but has been becoming moderately
more “legalist” under Xi Jinping than under his predecessor). A summary of some of these debates can be found at
Albert H.Y. Chen, China’s Long March Towards Rule of Law or Turn Against Law?, 4 CHINESE J. COMP. L. 1
(2016). All in all, the field currently contains a very vocal set of scholars who believe that China has turned against
legal reform, a much less vocal set of scholars who argue for some continuity between the current situation and
earlier reform trajectories (both of which, in their assessment, saw the Party maintain political dominance over the
legal system), but virtually no one who has systemically argued for a sharp and significant turn towards law and
legality—which is what this article attempts to accomplish.
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constitutionalism and the rule of law that the 1990s and early 2000s offered is now extinguished,
replaced with despotism and escalating levels of repression. With the removal in early 2018 of
constitutional term-limits for the presidency—a move which may allow current president Xi
Jinping to rule for life—such pessimism has reached a crescendo. 2 As one scholar puts it, China’s
“reform era” has ended, and its legal and political future are likely no brighter than its Maoist past. 3
This article offers a very different take on these developments. It argues that, contrary to
conventional accusations that China has “turned against law,” 4 Chinese politics have become
substantially more law-oriented over the past 5 years, and that several core legal institutions,
including the judiciary and the Constitution, are now more politically significant than at any point
in the 69-year history of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The CCP under Xi Jinping has
indeed centralized power and control to an almost unprecedented extent, but it has done this in a
highly legalistic way, empowering courts against other state and Party entities, insisting on legal
professionalism, and bringing political powers that were formerly the exclusive possession of the
Party under legal authorization and regulation. In fact, nowhere is this “legalism” —defined here
as a willingness to both operate in accordance with the written law and to strengthen the institutions
charged with its enforcement—more powerfully expressed than in the 2018 constitutional
amendments. The amendments show that, even if China is deepening its dictatorship, it is
nonetheless doing so through harnessing the organizational and legitimizing capacities of law,
rather than circumventing it.
These developments promise to fundamentally change the delicate balance between Party, State,
law, and society that has shaped Chinese politics and policymaking since Mao Zedong’s death in
1976. 5 Whereas, until quite recently, there was genuine uncertainty about the role that law could
play in political and social life—and indeed a long tradition of overriding or ignoring legal
institutions in modern Chinese politics—legal institutions have now assumed a position of central
importance and, in all likelihood, will continue to gain stature moving forward. In that sense,
China’s post-Mao “reform era” is indeed coming to an end, 6 but it will likely be followed by an
2

Given the very recent nature of these amendments, they have yet to appear in any academic article or book—this
article is the very first—although scholars have written many commentaries in media outlets: See, e.g., Andrew
Nathan, China: Back to the Future, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (May 10, 2018),
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2018/05/10/china-back-to-the-future/; Jerome Cohen, China is Likely to Enter
Another Long Period of Severe Dictatorship, JERRY’S BLOG (Feb. 26, 2018) http://www.jeromecohen.net/jerrysblog/china-is-likely-to-enter-another-long-period-of-severe-dictatorship [hereinafter Cohen, China Likely to Enter
Period of Severe Dictatorship]; Jerome Cohen, Xi Jinping Amends China’s Constitution, LAWFARE (Mar. 7, 2018,
12:21 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/xi-jinping-amends-chinas-constitution; Noah Feldman, China Now Faces
the Downsides of Dictatorship, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 26, 2018, 5:00 PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2018-02-26/china-and-xi-jinping-toss-aside-their-experiment-withstability; Jiayang Fan, Xi Jiping and the Perils of One-Person Rule in China, THE NEW YORKER (Mar. 1, 2018),
https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/xi-jinping-and-the-perils-of-one-person-rule-in-china.
3
See MINZNER, END OF AN ERA, supra note 1.
4
Minzner, Turn Against Law, supra note 1.
5
The most comprehensive overview of Chinese legal development since 1976 remains RANDALL PEERENBOOM,
CHINA’S LONG MARCH TOWARD RULE OF LAW (2002). See also, Benjamin Liebman, A Return to Populist Legality?
Historical Legacies and Legal Reform, in MAO’S INVISIBLE HAND (Elizabeth J. Perry & Sebastian Heilmann eds.,
2011); LUBMAN, BIRD IN A CAGE, supra note 1.
6
MINZNER, END OF AN ERA, supra note 1.
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era in which law plays a greater, not lesser, sociopolitical role in a consolidated and resilient
authoritarian regime.
These observations echo a growing recognition among political scientists and legal scholars that
law and courts are critically important institutions in authoritarian regimes. 7 The Chinese example
shows, in particular, that legal institutions, and even genuine commitment to legality in
governmental operations, can empower authoritarianism just as well as constrain it. In fact, not
only has the Party leadership under Xi acknowledged the political significance of law, it has
actively tried to strengthen it, and has reaped immense benefits along the way. Law, we argue
below, is strengthening both Party and state in China. Nonetheless, over the long term, the
sociopolitical entrenchment of legal institutions may very well constrain the Party’s exercise of
power—indeed, we might argue that it has already begun to do so—even if these constraints do
not necessarily conform to the normative expectations of liberal democracies.
One basic but crucial clarification needs to be made immediately: our argument here is that the
Party-state is moving towards legality, in which the technical letter of the law is enforced more
rigorously and afforded greater political respect, 8 rather than towards the rule of law, in which the
exercise of regular political power 9 at all levels is effectively constrained and regulated by law, or
towards some sort of substantive checks-and-balances constitutionalism. It is implausible to argue
that the Party leadership in general and Xi Jinping in particular is legally constrained in any real
sense. 10 On its own terms, Chinese law, including the Constitution, simply does not attempt to do
that, 11 and we observe no distinct trend towards substantive constitutionalism. Our descriptive
claims are much narrower: that the judiciary has become much more independent, professional,
and powerful under Xi; that the Constitution now plays a larger role in high politics and the
7

MARY E. GALLAGHER, AUTHORITARIAN LEGALITY IN CHINA (2017); Peter Solomon, Authoritarian Legality and
Informal Practices: Judges, Lawyers and the State in Russia and China, 43 COMMUNIST & POST-COMMUNIST STUD.
351 (2010); JOTHIE RAJAH, AUTHORITARIAN RULE BY LAW: LEGISLATION, DISCOURSE, AND LEGITIMACY IN
SINGAPORE (2012); YUHUA WANG, TYING THE AUTOCRAT’S HANDS (2015). A survey of pre-2014 academic
writings can be found in Tamir Moustafa, Law and Courts in Authoritarian Regimes 10 ANN. REV. L. SOC. SCI. 281
(2014).
8
We use “legality” in the most conventional sense of the word: “attachment to or observance of law.” Legality,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/legality.
9
As distinguished from constitutional politics. On this distinction, see, for example, BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE
PEOPLE, VOLUME 1: FOUNDATIONS (1993); JED RUBENFELD, REVOLUTION BY JUDICIARY: THE STRUCTURE OF
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2005).
10
Xi Jinping’s main slogan regarding the connection between the Party’s political leadership and legality is “ruling
the country according to law” (“yifa zhiguo”), which under Chinese political conventions means that “power
relations are ultimately under Xi Jinping as the core of the party,” but also that written laws should be rigorously
obeyed and enforced. Susan Trevaskes, A Law unto Itself: Chinese Communist Party Leadership and Yifa Zhiguo in
the Xi Era, 44 MOD. CHINA 347, 354-55 (2018). Arguably the most prominent academic defender of the Party’s
legal vision is Peking University professor Jiang Shigong, whose theory of Chinese constitutionalism nonetheless
includes no substantive restrictions on the Party leadership. Larry Catá Backer, Toward a Robust Theory of the
Chinese Constitutionalist State: Between Formalism and Legitmacy in Jiang Shigong’s Constitutionalism, 40 MOD.
CHINA 168 (2014).
11
This is especially true after the 2018 constitutional amendments, which wrote the Party’s leadership into the
Constitution, but places no formal constraints on how the Party should exercise that leadership. But even before, the
consensus among scholars was the Constitution simply did not touch upon the Party leadership. Xin He, The
Party’s Leadership as a Living Constitution in China, 42 HONG KONG L.J. 73 (Mar. 2012). See discussion infra at
Part III, Section C, pp. _-_.
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construction of political legitimacy; and that increasing legalism is to be observed in both the Party
and state apparatus. These changes likely facilitate legal compliance by other governmental
entities, including lower Party offices, but they create no direct constraint on the Party leadership’s
authority—if anything, they probably enhance it.
In this article, we first document the broad and powerful trend in recent Chinese politics towards
legality, and then provide several reasons for its emergence. First, we lay out the wide array of
political and institutional gains made by the judiciary since Xi Jinping took power in 2012, many
at the expense of other governmental entities: growing financial independence from local
governments, expanding jurisdiction over administrative disputes, the creation of circuit courts,
greater statutory interpretation authority, substantially stronger enforcement powers, and
heightened levels of legal proficiency and professionalism among judges. It is probably safe to
say that the courts have never been as independent, professional, and powerful in PRC history as
they currently are. 12 As many scholars have pointed out, the political position of the judiciary has
traditionally been very vulnerable, and may even have been in decline as recently as 5 or 6 years
ago. 13 Under Xi, however, the Party leadership has made a concerted effort to empower the
judiciary against other governmental entities, engineering a quick and dramatic turnaround in its
institutional status and capacity.
Second, we argue that the Chinese Constitution, long thought to be a politically insignificant
document, now carries substantial and steadily growing weight. Comparisons to political behavior
in previous decades suggest, moreover, that this is a recent development. 14 Our analysis centers
around the 2018 constitutional amendments, 15 which ended term limits and created a new branch
of government: although some commentators suggest that they demonstrate Xi’s disregard, if not
outright disdain, for rules and norms, 16 we believe that the opposite is likely true. Properly
understood, the removal of presidential term limits was an attempt to solidify Xi Jinping’s personal
authority through constitutional legitimation—but the significant political cost it extracted would
hardly have been worth it had the Constitution not already carried a good deal of legitimizing
authority in the Party leadership’s eyes.
In addition, the amendments consolidate a multi-year push to transfer some of the Party’s most
important political functions, especially its anti-corruption investigation powers, to
constitutionally empowered and legally regulated state “supervisory” institutions. The creation of

12
For a brief history of the development of courts up to 1978, see PEERENBOOM, supra note 5, at 27-54. Clearly, the
status of courts rose substantially after 1978, and continuously so until 2007-2008. See Shen Kui, Commentary on
“China’s Courts: Restricted Reforms”, 191 CHINA Q. 639 (2007). See also, Jonas Grimheden, The Reform Path of
the Chinese Judiciary: Progress or Stand-Still?, 30 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1000 (2006); Ling Li, The Chinese
Communist Party and People’s Courts: Judical Dependence in China, 64 AM. J. COMP. L. 37 (2016). We argue in
Part Two that they have now gained powers and status that they have never possessed, even before the 2008-2013
“turn against law,” and are therefore unprecedentedly powerful and independent, at least in the history of the PRC.
13
Minzner, Turn against Law, supra note 1; Liebman, Restricted Reform, supra note 1.
14
See discussion at infra Part Three, Section B.
15
ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHE GUO XIANFA XIUZHENGAN [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT OF THE PEOPLE’S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA] (Passed on March 11, 2018 by the First Meeting of the Thirteenth National People’s
Congress), available at http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2018lh/2018-03/11/c_1122521235.htm.
16
E.g., Feldman, supra note 2; Nathan, supra note 2.
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a National Supervision Commission seems to signal a growing belief within the Party leadership
that certain kinds of political authority are more effective and, perhaps more importantly, more
legitimate when wielded—at least in part—by a constitutionally sanctioned governmental entity,
rather than solely by a Party organ. Rather than diluting the sociopolitical salience and significance
of the Constitution, these developments are much more likely to strengthen them.
We then identify and discuss two kinds of rationales for this “turn towards law”: first, as a purely
instrumental matter, governing China in a centralized, top-down manner requires a strong
commitment to bureaucratic legalization. The sheer size of the country and its population creates
severe principal-agent problems that force central authorities to either recognize some version of
de-facto federalism, or to combat local corruption and abuse through rigorous law enforcement. 17
Whereas previous regimes in the 1980s and 1990s were happy to allow the former, 18 Xi has
conspicuously turned against federalism, 19 and must therefore pursue the latter strategy of
enhancing control through legal reform. 20 In addition, the ever-increasing levels of demographic
and commercial mobility in the Chinese economy generate both enormous demand and enormous
difficulties for institutionalized information collection and contractual enforcement. 21 Because
informal, community-based institutions are less functional under conditions of high demographic
mobility, 22 empowering legal institutions is arguably the best way—possibly the only way—to
effectively address these challenges.
Second, and perhaps more importantly, the Chinese population increasingly seems to attach
significant amounts of sociopolitical legitimacy to law and legal institutions. As the explosion of
civil and administrative litigation in recent years suggests, it has undergone a sort of “legal
awakening.” 23 This has given the legal system—even the aloof and rarely invoked Constitution—
17

Maria Edin, State Capacity and Local Agent Control in China: CCP Cadre Management from a Township
Perspective, 173 CHINA Q. 35 (2003); Murray Scot Tanner & Eric Green, Principals and Secret Agents: Central
Versus Local Control Over Policing and Obstacles to “Rule of Law” in China, 191 CHINA Q. 644 (2007); Zheng,
supra note 18; DAVID M. LAMPTON ED., POLICY IMPLEMENTATION IN POST-MAO CHINA (Stud. on China, Vol. 7,
1987).
18
David Shambaugh, The Chinese State in the Post-Mao Era, in THE MODERN CHINESE STATE (David Shambaugh,
ed. 2000); PIERRE F. LANDRY, DECENTRALIZED AUTHORITARIANISM IN CHINA: THE COMMUNIST PARTY’S CONTROL
OF LOCAL ELITES IN THE POST-MAO ERA (2008); Gabriella Montinola, Yingyi Qian & Barry R. Weingast,
Federalism, Chinese Style, 48 WORLD POL. 50 (1995); YONGNIAN ZHENG, DE FACTO FEDERALISM IN CHINA:
REFORMS AND DYNAMICS OF CENTRAL-LOCAL RELATIONS (2007).
19
For an overview of political developments under Xi, see ELIZABETH C. ECONOMY, THE THIRD REVOLUTION: XI
JINPING AND THE NEW CHINESE STATE (2018); Zhao, supra note 1; CHENG LI, CHINESE POLITICS IN THE XI JINPING
ERA: REASSESSING COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP (2016).
20
Compare ECONOMY, supra note 19, at 38 (Federalism one of the “five nos” announced in 2011); and ZHENG,
supra note 18 (discussing de facto federalism in earlier eras).
21
See Montinola, Qian & Weingast, supra note 18; Chenggang Xu, The Fundamental Institutions of China’s
Reforms and Development, 49 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1076 (2011); Xiaodong Zhu, Understanding China’s Growth:
Past, Present, and Future, 26 J. ECON. PERSP. 103 (2012). One recent effort to combat these problems involves the
construction of a “national credit rating system.” See Xin Dai, Toward a Reputation State: The Social Credit System
Project of China (June 10, 2018) (manuscript on file with authors).
22
The classic work on communal disintegration under conditions of commercialization remains JAMES SCOTT, THE
MORAL ECONOMY OF THE PEASANT (1977). For a more recent discussion of a similar process, see BARAK D.
RICHMAN, STATELESS COMMERCE: THE DIAMOND NETWORK AND THE PERSISTENCE OF RELATIONAL EXCHANGE
(2017).
23
See discussion at infra Part II, Section D; Part IV, Section B.
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a social significance and prestige that Party leaders have come to grips with only in the past several
years. 24 As a result, empowering legal institutions has now become an important and often
effective political strategy: positioning the Party leadership as a champion of law and legalization
against traditional bureaucratic corruption has been a major source of both personal status for Xi
and general political legitimacy for the Party. Not only does it allow Xi to prosecute his enemies
in a socially popular manner, but it also favorably distinguishes his regime from its immediate
predecessor, in which, according to some scholars legal institutions were treated with evident
skepticism, even hostility. 25
The new political emphasis on legality and legal legitimation is therefore, at least in part, a
straightforward response to underlying changes in social sentiment, which were in turn encouraged
by policy choices made as far back as the early PRC, or even before that. After decades of onand-off ideological and institutional investment in building “the socialist rule of law,” 26 the legal
system now provides a powerful opportunity structure for the Party to respond to. But by
responding in this fashion, the Party will likely further increase the sociopolitical salience and
importance of legal institutions. This dynamic suggests a self-reinforcing cycle in which legalistic
social sentiments create the institutional conditions for their own entrenchment and expansion.
These two rationales, one rooted in political economy, the other in social sentiment and ideology,
are mutually complementary. On the one hand, the ever-increasing scale, complexity and mobility
of the Chinese economy tends to generate social demand for strong legal institutions, which in turn
boosts their social and political prestige. On the other hand, any growth in the sociopolitical
prestige of legal institutions tends to strengthen their instrumental functionality, while
simultaneously weakening the functionality of extra-legal forms of administration and dispute
resolution. In all likelihood, the two rationales coexist in a sort of “virtuous” cycle.
This coexistence demonstrates why it is deeply problematic to say that the Xi and the Party
leadership are merely using law as a top-down tool for control—that they are simply
instrumentally investing in “rule by law” as conventionally understood in the authoritarian legality
literature. 27 The bottom-up, popular legitimation-type incentives for legality are at least as strong
as the supply side ones, and are likely more durable over the long run. The sociopolitical prestige
24

See discussion at infra Part IV, Section B.
See discussion at infra pp. _-_.
26
Fu, supra note 1; CHINA’S LONG MARCH TOWARD RULE OF LAW, supra note 5; AUTHORITARIAN LEGALITY IN
CHINA, supra note 7; Eric W. Orts, The Rule of Law in China, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 43 (2001). On pre-1978
investment, see JENNIFER ALTEHENGER, LEGAL LESSONS: POPULARIZING LAWS IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA, 1949-1989 (Harv. East Asian Monographs, 411, 2018) (discussing legal education campaigns in the Mao
Era).
27
Note that this use of “rule by law”—commonly understood to be a top-down vision of sociopolitical control
through law enforcement—is substantially narrower than the concept of “rational-legal authority” in the Weberian
sense, which emphasizes the social legitimizing capacity of legal professionalism and “rational” governance. MAX
WEBER, ECONOMICS AND SOCIETY 243 (Roth & Wittich eds., 1968). For discussion on the finer implications of
“rule by law” in the contemporary authoritarian legality literature, see PEERENBOOM, supra note 5, at 138-39; see
generally TOM GINSBURG & TAMIR MOUSTAFA, EDS., RULE BY LAW: THE POLITICS OF COURTS IN AUTHORITARIAN
REGIMES (2008) [hereinafter RULE BY LAW]; see also Xin Chunying, Postmodern Jurisprudence: An Inquiry into
the Future of Rule by Law, 2000-5 SOC. SCI. CHINA 59 (2000), for a discussion on the Chinese jurisprudence related
to this concept.
25
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and status of law has, as noted above, a tendency to self-reinforce. The more political leaders
empower legal institutions, the more they boost their social and political salience, and the greater
the costs of “turning against law.” Over the long term, this could potentially impose political
constraints, if not necessarily legal ones, on the Party-state that are both powerful and highly
durable.
This article makes a number of empirical and theoretical contributions: for scholars of Chinese
law, it provides the most comprehensive survey to date of judicial and constitutional developments
in the Xi Jinping era. 28 More importantly, it pushes strongly against the conventional wisdom that
law is, and is increasingly, politically unimportant in China, 29 and instead seeks to place it firmly
at the center of recent political developments. This produces a fundamentally new picture of
Chinese law and politics—one that ties together multiple dimensions of economic, social, and
ideological change through their common engagement with law—and generates very different
predictions for their future development. We also elucidate some previously underappreciated
features of the Party-state, explaining how its current structural layout demands higher levels of
legality in both the Party and the state.
On a more theoretical level, the article seeks to expand our understanding of when and how highly
authoritarian regimes feel compelled to strengthen their legal institutions. Traditionally, scholars
have assumed that the empowerment of courts and constitutions is a unique feature of liberal
democracies, 30 but a growing literature shows that autocracies, even budding dictatorships, not
only can co-exist with such empowerment, but are often particularly eager to pursue it. 31 In fact,
the inherent factional instability of autocracies, especially when an aspiring dictator is attempting
to centralize power against the preexisting status quo, can create social and political conditions in
which legal organization and legitimation are crucially important. 32 The Chinese case adds much
28

Scholars have provided shorter comments on judicial reform, see Liebman, Law-Stability Paradox, supra note 1;
Peerenboom, supra note 1; Minzner, Legal Reform, supra note 1; deLisle, supra note 1; but no systemic survey.
There have been no articles on the 2018 constitutional amendments, and only a few on post-2012 constitutional
discourse: Rogier Creemers, China’s Constitutionalism Debate: Content, Context And Implications, 74 CHINA J. 91
(2015); Thomas E. Kellogg, Arguing Chinese Constitutionalism: The 2013 Constitutional Debate and the
“Urgency” of Political Reform, 11 U. PA. ASIAN L. REV. 337 (2015). We leave out surveys written in Chinese
because, given the increasingly tight political control over the Mainland Chinese legal academy in recent years, it is
increasingly difficult to separate genuine scholarly assessment from political rhetoric in general surveys of legal and
judicial reform. For an example, see Long Zongzhi, Sifa Gaige: Huigu, Jianshi, yu Qianzhan [Judicial Reform:
Looking Back, Reflection, and Looking Forward], 2017(7) FAXUE [LEGAL STUDIES] 11. Academic writing on
constitutionalism in general, and the 2018 amendments in particular, is almost completely banned in the Mainland at
the moment.
29
E.g., Minzner, Turn Against Law, supra note 1; MINZNER, END OF AN ERA, supra note 1; LUBMAN, BIRD IN A
CAGE, supra note 1; Qianfan, supra note 1.
30
Moustafa, supra note 7, at 1 (“Until recently, courts in authoritarian regimes were generally regarded as little
more than window dressing for dictators. The assumption was so widely accepted that research on judicial politics in
nondemocracies was rare prior to the 1990s.”)
31
See sources cited at supra note 7. See also, ROBERT BARROS, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DICTATORSHIP (2000);
Mark Tushnet, Authoritarian Constitutionalism, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 391 (2015); TOM GINSBURG & ALBERTO
SIMPSER, EDS., CONSTITUTIONS IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES (2014).
32
Previous scholarship has highlighted how factional turnover or the prospect of factional turnover can incentivize
those in power to invest in legality and constitutionalism as a safeguard against possible future persecution. See
GINSBURG & SIMPSER, supra note 31. In this article, we highlight a different kind of incentive to do so: the need for
rulers who are challenging the factional status quo to invest in legality to garner populist support—in order to appeal

8

Electroniccopy
copyavailable
available at:
at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3250948
Electronic
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3250948

to our understanding of authoritarian legality, in that it is observably grounded both in the Partystate and in society, responding to both “supply side” planning concerns, and, perhaps more
importantly, to “demand side” social sentiment. 33
This last point leads to a final caveat before we begin. The Chinese Party-State is clearly engaged
in acts of severe repression, particularly in the western regions of Xinjiang and Tibet, but also
against religious minorities and dissidents in the core regions of China. 34 Much of this repression
is carried out under explicit legal authorization, while other aspects of it are perhaps better
characterized by what Ernst Fraenkel called “the prerogative state” in his classic study of
authoritarian legality: not quite illegal, but nonetheless operating without clear legal regulation
and definition. 35 Our reference to societal demand for greater legality is focused on the routine
interactions of citizens with government and the judiciary, and we take no position on whether
popular opinion supports these repressive acts or not. Nor, for that matter, are we offering any
normative defense of Chinese legal practices. Instead, we simply articulate a positive and
explanatory account of the increasing role of law in sustaining China’s authoritarian regime.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Part I summarizes both the preexisting
academic literature and several major trends in legal development prior to the Xi Jinping era. Part
II examines the empowerment of the judiciary since 2012. Part III discusses changes in
constitutional law and discourse. Part IV identifies possible rationales for this recent wave of
legalistic politics, surveying both top-down political economy-oriented possibilities and bottomup ideological ones. The Conclusion briefly discusses the article’s theoretical and practical
implications.

I.

A “Turn Against Law,” or Towards It?

to a population that demands law-oriented governance and considers it a condition of political legitimacy. See
discussion infra at Part IV, Section B.
33
On Xi’s political style, cf. Shirk, supra note 1; and Jerome Cohen, Xi Jinping’s Aspirations, JERRY’S BLOG (March
17, 2018), http://www.jeromecohen.net/jerrys-blog/2018/3/16/xi-jinpings-aspirations (“personalistic one-man rule
enhanced by efficient Party controls of all aspects of life”).
34
The crackdowns in Xinjiang and Tibet are often attacked as “illegal” or “extralegal,” but they are not entirely
without legal basis: large-scale government activity in both cases was preceded by provincial legislation/regulation
that could somewhat plausibly be interpreted as legally authorizing that activity, including the construction and
operation of “reeducation camps” in Xinjiang. Certainly, these authorizations are often vague and imprecise, and
their exact boundaries impossible to pinpoint, but their existence nonetheless urges against an understanding of
recent developments as completely outside the sphere of the law, or actually “illegal.” See, e.g, Human Rights
Watch, Illegal oranizations: China’s Crackdown on Tibetan Social Groups, July 30, 2018, available at
https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/07/30/illegal-organizations/chinas-crackdown-tibetan-social-groups [last accessed
Aug. 1, 2018] (Tibet); Nicholas Becquelin, Criminalizing Ethnicity: Political Repression in Xinjiang, CHINA
RIGHTS FILE, available at https://www.hrichina.org/sites/default/files/PDFs/CRF.1.2004
/b1_Criminalizing1.2004.pdf [last accessed Aug. 1, 2018] (Xinjiang); Tom Philips, In China’s Far West the
“Perfect Police State” is Emerging, THE GUARDIAN, June 22, 2017 [last accessed Aug. 1, 2018]
35
ERNST FRAENKEL, THE DUAL STATE (1941).
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In an influential article written in the waning years of the Hu Jintao regime, legal scholar Carl
Minzner warned of a “turn against law” in China. 36 He argued that post-1978 legal reforms, which
had largely relied on building up capacity in the legal system as a basis for economic development,
had generated unwanted by-products from the perspective of the CCP. These included wide-spread
use of litigation, social protest, and, most disturbingly of all, the emergence of a set of rightspromoting weiquan lawyers, who sought to use the law to constrain the Party-state itself in the
early 2000s. 37 As Minzner documented, this led to a backlash under President Hu Jintao, which
included a de-emphasis on formal law and court adjudication, and the subjugation of judicial power
to political imperatives. The shift was perhaps encapsulated in the appointment of Wang Shengjun,
a man with no legal training, as the President of the Supreme People’s Court in 2008. 38 Instead of
formal law, the Party sought to promote mediation as the preferred means of resolving social
disputes, indeed as an institutional embodiment of the “Harmonious Society” promoted by
President Hu Jintao. 39 Minzner projected this forward to suggest that legality was on a long-term
path of decline. 40
Minzner was not alone in his criticism of Chinese courts. Many scholars have been consistent
critics of China’s judiciary and legal institutions, which Stanley Lubman famously characterized
as a “bird in a cage.” 41 While noting the significant legislative and institutional reforms initiated
during the Deng Xiaoping period, Lubman remained deeply skeptical that China’s judges would
ever develop significant institutional autonomy from the Party-state. 42 Benjamin Liebman, too,
has noted that China’s leaders had turned away from legal institutions in the Hu Jintao era, after
significant investment for the first decades of reform, because they saw law as potentially
destabilizing. 43 Unlike Minzner, however, he described this as a “law-stability paradox” in which

36

Minzner, Turn Against Law, supra note 1; see also MINZNER, END OF AN ERA, supra note 1.
Zhiwei Tong, A Comment on the Rise and Fall of the Supreme People’s Court’s Reply to Qi Yuling’s Case, 43
SUFFOLK UNIV. L. REV. 101, 103-06 (2010); Thomas E. Kellogg, Constitutionalism with Chinese Characteristics?
Constitutional Development and Civil Litigation in China, 7 INT. J. CON. L. 215, 220-26 (2009); Keith Hand, Using
Law for a Righteous Purpose: The Sun Zhigang Incident and Evolving Forms of Citizen Action in the People’s
Republic of China, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 114 (2006); Fu Hualing, Embedded Socio-Legal Activism in
China: The Case of Yirenping, (U.H.K. Fac. L., Research Paper No. 2012/029), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2096998.
38
Taisu Zhang, Reinterpreting the Supreme People’s Court of China, 62 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1 (2012). The Chinese
scholarly reaction to Wang’s appointment was immediate and negative. See, e.g., Wang Liping, Sifa gaige wu lu
ketui [There is No Way Back for Judicial Reform], HE WEIFANG DE BOLUOGE [HE WEIFANG’S BLOG], Sep. 5, 2008,
http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_488663200100awek.html.
39
Yongnian Zheng & Sow Keat Tok, ‘Harmonious Society’ and ‘Harmonious World’: China’s Policy Discourse
Under Hu Jintao, CHINA POL’Y INST. BRIEFING SERIES ISSUE 26 (2007); Minzner, Turn Against Law, supra note 1;
Liebman, supra note 5.
40
Minzner, Turn Against Law, supra note 1.
41
LUBMAN, BIRD IN A CAGE, supra note 1. See also, Jerome A. Cohen, Reforming China’s Civil Procedure:
Judging the Courts, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 793 (1997); PILS, supra note 1; Donald Clarke, The Chinese Legal System
Since 1995: Steady Development, Striking Continuities, 191 CHINA Q. 555 (2007) (arguing that the Party’s
commitment to legality has been continuously inconsistent and weak).
42
Lubman, BIRD IN A CAGE supra note 1; but see Stanley Lubman, The Evolution of Law Reform in China: An
Uncertain Path, in THE EVOLUTION OF CHINESE LAW REFORM xvii, lxvi (Stanley Lubman, ed., 2012) (“legal
institutions have developed, albeit whtin boundaries enforced by the Party-State.”
43
Liebman, supra note 5.
37
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the capacity and independence of the legal system oscillated over time between growth and
regression. 44
These arguments represent the most recent wave of an English-language literature on Chinese law
that emphasizes the marginalized position of law in Chinese politics and administration. The
conventional wisdom has long been that, while the Party-state rhetorically recognizes the “rule of
law,” it regularly overrides and undermines legal institutions up and down the governmental
hierarchy for political reasons and, in the end, has no reliable commitment to legality at any level,
much less real “rule of law.” 45 As a result, the judicial system is regularly portrayed as weak and
politicized, despite some efforts to change that, 46 while the Chinese Constitution is regarded as
almost completely ineffective. 47
For decades, scholars have emphasized the Chinese judiciary’s limitations and inadequacies: most
Chinese law experts would likely acknowledge that, until the “turn against law” under Hu Jintao,
some progress had been made in terms of institutional independence and judicial
professionalism, 48 but they would also hasten to point out that much of this progress has stagnated
in recent years and that, in any case, the courts remain fundamentally incapable of challenging
most other governmental and Party entities of the same bureaucratic rank. 49 The Supreme People’s
Court (SPC) is, of course, clearly incapable of challenging the Party leadership, 50 but the claim is
that this weakness extends all the way down to local courts and governments. Empirical studies
of judicial behavior have, for example, identified high levels of regularity and predictability in the
conduct of local courts, but nonetheless emphasize that political interference remains regular and
institutionally unchecked. 51 Scholars who survey this literature are therefore sympathetic to the
44

Id.
E.g., Lubman, BIRD IN A CAGE, supra note 1; Donald C. Clarke, The Execution of Civil Judgements in China, 141
CHINA Q. 65 (1995); Ling Li, The Chinese Communist Party and People’s Courts: Judicial Dependence in China,
64 AM. J. COMP. L. 37 (2016); WANG, supra note 7 (portraying judicial behavior as politically motivated, and
independent of local governmental interference only to the extent that it is fiscally beneficial to provincial and citylevel authorities); Ji Li, The Power Logic of Justice in China, AM. J. COMP. L. (forthcoming 2016) (arguing that
Chinese judicial decision-making is fundamentally driven by power considerations); Fu Yulin & Randall
Peerenboom, A New Analytic Framework for Understanding and Promoting Judicial Independence in China, in
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN CHINA 95 (Randall Peerenboom ed., 2010); Stéphanie Balme, Local Courts in Western
China, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN CHINA, supra, at 154; Xin He, The Judiciary Pushes Back, in JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE IN CHINA, supra, at 180. But see Randall Peerenboom, Judicial Independence in China, in JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE IN CHINA, supra, at 69, 69.
46
Li, supra note 45; Xin He, The Politics of Courts in China, 2 CHINA L. SOC’Y REV. 129 (2017).
47
Kellogg, supra note 37; Stéphanie Balme & Michael W. Dowdle, Introduction: Exploring for Constitutionalism in
21st Century China, in BUILDING CONSTITUTIONALISM IN CHINA (Stéphanie Balme & Michael W. Dowdle eds.,
2009); Qianfan Zhang, A Constitution without Constitutionalism? The Paths of Constitutional Development in
China, 8 INT’L J. CONST. L. 950 (2010); Qianfan Zhang, On the Selective Application of the Chinese Constitution, 2
Peking U. L.J. 4, 6 (2014).
48
Donald C. Clarke, Puzzling Observations in Chinese Law: When is a Riddle Just a Mistake? In UNDERSTANDING
CHINA’S LEGAL SYSTEM: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF JEROME A. COHEN 93 (C. Stephen Hsu ed., 2003); Peerenboom,
supra note 1.
49
Li, supra note 45.
50
Judicial constitutional review does not exist in China. Kellogg, supra note 37. Beyond that, the Court simply has
no political capacity to review or even question any decision made by the Party leadership. See Zhang, supra note
38, at 30-3238.
51
He, supra note 46.
45
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conventional position that Chinese courts, like courts in other authoritarian regimes, are all too
often mere pawns of the state and thus have little judicial independence, 52 even as they observe
that “the regime and the judiciary have long emphasized judicial fairness and experienced progress
in dispute resolution.” 53
Somewhat more stridently, since the enactment of the current Constitution in 1982—or, for that
matter, the enactment of the PRC’s first Constitution in 1954—the dominant academic view has
been that the document wields virtually no influence over high politics. 54 Whereas scholars have
debated whether the document functions effectively as a signal of general socioeconomic policy
or as a coordinator of regular governmental activity, almost none would argue that it plays any
major role in high politics. 55 Indeed, even at the lower levels of government, an enormous portion
of the Party-state—that is, the entire Party apparatus —has traditionally functioned without any
constitutional recognition whatsoever. Prior to 2018, the Constitution mentioned the Party only in
its Preamble, and had literally nothing to say about its institutional composition or sociopolitical
position. 56 The true seat of power in Chinese politics, the Party’s Politburo Standing Committee
(PSC), goes completely unmentioned. 57 Add to this the fact that the courts possessed no authority
of constitutional review, and that the entity formally imbued with this power, the Standing
Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPCSC), was directly controlled by a member of
the PSC, 58 and it is altogether unsurprising that scholars attached meager to no political or legal
significance to the Constitution. Even those who have attempted to argue that the NPCSC does
conduct some a priori constitutional review have found of such review only in relatively marginal
matters, rather than major policy areas. 59 Under this conventional wisdom, the Party leadership
rarely, if ever, took the Constitution into account when making decisions, knowing that it imposed
almost no formal constraints on their power—and if it ever did, that they could remove or
circumvent them very easily. 60

52

See Tamir Moustafa & Tom Ginsburg, Introduction, in RULE BY LAW, supra note27, at 1,2 (summarizing and
criticizing the conventional wisdom that authoritarian courts are mere “pawns”); He, supra note 46, at 131, 135
(“[Counterarguments] may have some merit, but they cannot alter the fact that Chinese courts indeed lack judicial
independence.”).
53
He, supra note 46.
54
See sources cited at supra note 47; Suisheng Zhao, The China Model: Can It Replace the Western Model of
Modernization?, 19 J. CONTEMP. CHINA 419 (2010); JAMES C.F. WANG, CONTEMPORARY CHINESE POLITICS: AN
INTRODUCTION (7th ed. 2001); John P. Burns, The People’s Republic of China at 50: National Political Reform, 159
CHINA Q. 580 (1999); Pitman B. Potter, The Chinese Legal System: Continuing Commitment to the Primacy of State
Power, 159 CHINA Q. 673 (1999).
55
Clarke, supra note 48, at 103-09 (PRC Constitution “perhaps the least important document” in the legal system.)
56
CONSTITUTION OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (after amendment on March 14, 2004) [hereinafter 2004
CONSTITUTION], available at http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Constitution/node_2825.htm.
57
Id.
58
A list of NPCSC Chairmen can be found at National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China,
Standing Committee, http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Organization/node_2847.htm. On Politburo control, see
Sophia Woodman, Legislative Interpretation by China’s National People’s Congress Standing Committee, in
INTERPRETING HONG KONG’S BASIC LAW: THE STRUGGLE FOR COHERENCE (Fu Hualing, Lison Harris & Simon
N.M. Young eds., 2007); TONY SAICH, NATIONAL PEOPLE’S CONGRESS: FUNCTIONS AND MEMBERSHIP (2015)
59
See, e.g.,Yan Lin & Tom Ginsburg, Constitutional Interpretation in Law-Making: China's Invisible Constitutional
Enforcement Mechanism, 63 AM. J. COMP. L. 467 (2015).
60
See sources cited at supra note 54.
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The ascent of Xi Jinping to the position of General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party in
later 2012 marked a major turning point for both China in general and for the role of the legal
system in particular. Under the banner of restoring China to “great power” status, 61 Xi has
concentrated extraordinary personal power, but at the same time, has championed law-oriented
governance as a pathway to stability, growth, and development. Under his watch, the Party
leadership has launched a vigorous and unprecedentedly broad anti-corruption campaign 62 and
pushed through a sweeping set of reforms with long-term implications for the judiciary, the
Constitution, and many other legal institutions.
Scholarly interpretation of these institutional developments has been sparse and uneven: the most
common position, expressed by Jerome Cohen and others through opinion pieces in various media
outlets, is that Xi’s concentration of personal power has undermined “the rule of law” by increasing
the “arbitrary” exercise of power by government agents and eroding some of the legal protections
that citizens previously enjoyed. 63 This altogether pessimistic position emphasizes, in particular,
the ongoing crackdown on civil rights activism by lawyers and advocacy groups and the escalation
of state censorship, but makes little mention of more positive developments in law enforcement.
In such a narrative, the deterioration of Chinese legal institutions, which began under Hu, has only
accelerated under Xi.
Liebman and Fu Hualing, on the other hand, have recently penned short essays that articulate a
more nuanced view: despite these crackdowns, in their view, the Chinese government does reap
substantial benefits from political investment in legality, including more effective socioeconomic
dispute resolution, stronger control over local agents, and some measure of political legitimacy. 64
It therefore sincerely pursues legal reform from time to time, including at the beginning of the Xi
Jinping regime. Both scholars are, however, quick to temper this more positive assessment with
nods towards the Party-state’s authoritarian nature: Fu acknowledges that the Party leadership’s
desire to maintain absolute power causes it to resist social demand for political legality. 65 Liebman,
as noted above, emphasizes the cyclical nature of Chinese state behavior, in which its positive
commitment to legal reform is diluted and periodically overridden by a deep mistrust of legality. 66

61

Xi Jinping Addresses the American Public, National Committee on US-China Relations,
https://www.ncuscr.org/content/full-text-president-xi-jinpings-speech (last visited July 25, 2018).
62
Shirk, supra note 1; Cohen, supra note 33; LI, supra note 19, at 7-40; Samson Yuen, Disciplining the Party: Xi
Jinping’s Anti-Corruption Campaign and its Limits, 2014 CHINA PERSP. 41; Fu Hualing, Wielding the Sword:
President Xi’s New Anti-Corruption Campaign, in GREED, CORRUPTION, AND THE MODERN STATE (Susan RoseAckerman & Paul Felipe Lagunes eds., 2015).
63
E.g., Jerome Cohen, China’s Latest Legislative Effort and the Rule of Law, JERRY’S BLOG (March 10, 2017),
http://www.jeromecohen.net/jerrys-blog/chinas-latest-legislative-effort; Cohen, China Likely to Enter Period of
Severe Dictatorship, supra note 2; Lubman, After Crackdown Reform Path Uncertain, supra note 1; Nancy Tang,
Keith Hand, Eva Pils, Taisu Zhang & Thomas Kellogg, China’s ‘Rule by Law’ Takes an Ugly Turn, FOREIGN
POLICY: CHINAFILE (July 14, 2015, 2:17 PM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/07/14/chinas-rule-by-law-takes-anugly-turn-rights-lawyers-crackdown-xi-jinping/; Orville Schell, Crackdown in China: Worse and Worse, N.Y. REV.
BOOKS (Apr. 21, 2016), https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2016/04/21/crackdown-in-china-worse-and-worse/.
Such criticism has, of course, spiked after the 2018 constitutional amendments. See sources cited at supra note 2.
64
Liebman, Law-Stability Paradox, supra note 1; Fu, supra note 62; Fu, supra note 1.
65
Fu, supra note 1.
66
Liebman, Law-Stability Paradox, supra note 1.
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The differences between these positions remain, at present, impressionistic rather than empirical.
Five years into the Xi regime, scholars have produced brief comments on its legal reform agenda,
but no robust factual account capable of either reaffirming the “turn against law” narrative or
substantially revising it. There has been no comprehensive analysis of post-2012 judicial reforms,
nor a survey of constitutional discourse and practice. 67 Scholars have therefore been slow and
more than a little hesitant in coming to terms with the scope and significance of recent
developments.
This has allowed some enormously important changes to fly under the academic radar. The past
five years have, in fact, seen China turn towards law and legality in a decisive and often dramatic
manner. Here, we provide a comprehensive assessment of judicial and constitutional
developments under the Xi regime, and discuss their long and short term causes. Our findings run
directly contrary to any notion that China has turned or is turning “against law,” and instead show
that the Party leadership now places greater emphasis—real, substantial emphasis—on legality
than ever before. Moreover, a closer look at the underlying causes of this turn suggest that it is
likely more durable and serious than even more sympathetic observers have acknowledged, 68 and
that China is entering a phase of institutional development where the sociopolitical status of law
and courts has become largely self-reinforcing.

II.

Empowering the Courts

The conventional view of the Chinese judiciary among academics is, with some exceptions, one
of institutional weakness, lack of independence, and political irrelevance. 69 We argue here that
this view is increasingly outdated. Over the past five years, the Party Leadership has strategically
expanded the courts’ institutional capacity and political independence, with the express objective
of building them into an effective check against most other governmental entities—not including,
of course, the Party Leadership itself. Thus, the judiciary remains limited in many ways, and the
prospect of constitutional review by the courts as distant as ever, but it would nonetheless be
accurate to say that it has never been as professional, independent, and politically powerful in PRC
history as it currently is. Moreover, this upward trend shows no sign of subsiding any time soon.
This Part surveys the major court-related developments in the Xi era, and, in doing so, provides a
much-needed correction to the conventional assumption of Chinese judicial weakness. It organizes
these developments into three major categories, each occupying its own Section: reforms that boost
the judiciary’s professionalism and institutional capacity, reforms that strengthen its independence,
and reforms that expand its review powers over state and Party organs. A final section summarizes
and considers possible counterarguments.

67

Kellogg, supra note 28, discusses one particular episode in post-2012 Constitutional discourse.
See infra Part IV, Section B, and Conclusion.
69
See discussions surrounding supra notes 45-53.
68
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A.

Professionalism and Institutional Capacity

As many scholars have noted, the five to six years preceding Xi Jinping’s rise to power were
marked by stagnation, or perhaps even regression, in judicial reform. 70 Instead, the Party
leadership expressed a strong interest in promoting mediation as the primary means of dispute
resolution, and pressured courts to function less as enforcers of the law and more as managers of
personal ties and conflicts. 71 As part of a general program to increase the courts’ responsiveness
to “the feelings of the masses,” judges were systemically evaluated on the percentage of their
cases—the more the better—that were either mediated or voluntarily withdrawn. 72 In many ways,
these measures echoed the broader effort made by the Hu Jintao regime to create a “harmonious
society” in which private conflict receded and state-society relationships improved. 73 Under this
general agenda, courts were directed to seek out less antagonistic and divisive means of dispute
resolution, and therefore to prioritize mediation, which gave at least the appearance of mutual
consent, over formal adjudication. 74
For reasons discussed below, this “turn against law” was never very popular, and may even have
deepened the population’s fear and resentment towards judicial corruption and bias. 75 It was
discarded, in any case, almost as soon as Xi Jinping rose to power in 2012-13, and replaced with
a renewed and, in many ways, heightened commitment towards increasing legal professionalism
and judicial capacity. 76 Since 2014, language emphasizing the need to build a “modern” and
professional judiciary has occupied a prominent position in virtually every government document
related to legal reform, while “allowing judges to adjudicate and holding them responsible for their
decisions” has systemically replaced “mediate if possible, adjudicate if appropriate” as the new

70

Minzer, Turn Against Law, supra note 1; Liebman, supra note 5; Fu & Cullen, supra note 1.
Guanyu Jin Yi Bu Fahui Susong Tiaojie zai Goujian Shehui Zhuyi Hexie Shehui zhong Jiji Zuoyong de Ruogan
Yijian (关于进一步发挥诉讼调解在构建社会主义和谐社会中积极作用的若干意见) [Several Opinions on
Further Enhancing the Positive Effect of Court-Directed Mediation in the Construction of a Harmonious Socialist
Society] (promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct., Mar. 6, 2007, effective Mar. 6, 2007), SUP. PEOPLE’S CT. GAZ., Apr.
1, 2007, at 25, available at http://rmfyb.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=106477; Minzer, Turn Against Law,
supra note 1; Liebman, supra note 5; Zang Dongsheng, Rise of Political Populism and the Trouble with the Legal
Profession in China, 6 HARV. CHINA REV. 79 (2010); Randall Peerenboom, Between Global Norms and Domestic
Realities: Judicial Reforms in China, 2010 LAWASIA J. 1; Eva Pils, Yang Jia and China’s Unpopular Criminal
Justice System, CHINA RTS. F., Mar. 2009, at 59, available at http://hrichina.org/public/PDFs/CRF.1.2009/CRF-20091_Pils.pdf (discussing the SPC’s embracement of populism under Wang Shengjun)
72
Jiedu Zuigao Fayuan “26 Xiang Zhibiao” (解读最高法院“26 项指标”) [Interpreting the “26 Indicators” Issued
by the Supreme Court], Shijiazhuang Shi Yuhua Qu Renmin Fayuan Wang (石家庄市雨花区人民法院网)
[PEOPLE’S CT. OF YUHUA DISTRICT, SHIJIAZHUANG NET], http://www.yhqfy.com/show.asp?id=178 (last visited Dec.
24, 2017)
73
See sources cited at supra note 71.
74
Tiaopan Jiehe Hexie Sifa (调判结合 和谐司法) [Unify Mediation and Adjudication, Judicial Harmony], Renmin
Wang (人民网) [PEOPLE’S NET] (March 7, 2007, 3:49 PM),
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/32306/54155/57487/5448606.html (interview with SPC justice Wan Exiang). For
academic commentary, see Yi Zhongfa (易忠法), Lun “Anjie Shiliao” (论“案结事了”) [Discussing “Deciding the
Case and Solving the Problem”], 2 Fazhi yu Shehui (法制与社会) [LAW & SOC’Y] 194 (2008).
75
See discussion at infra pp. _-_.
76
Liebman, Law-Stability paradox, supra note 1.
71
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slogan for desirable judicial behavior. 77 The People’s Daily, the Party’s primary newspaper, went
as far as to openly criticize “pursuing mediation and withdrawal in an unbalanced manner,” and
cautioned against the use of numerical quotas to evaluate judicial performance. 78 The seriousness
of this rhetorical change is reflected in the fact that nationwide mediation and withdrawal rates—
which increased from around 55% to nearly 70% during the Hu Jintao era—plummeted back to
57% over the first two years of the “Xi era.” 79
In subsequent years, numerous reforms were implemented to increase the judiciary’s capacity to
both adjudicate professionally and effectively enforce their decisions. The watershed moment that
drew the most outside attention was a decision issued in late 2014 by the Fourth Plenum of the
CCP Central Committee on “ruling the country according to law” (“yifa zhiguo”), which laid out
a number of principles and objectives for legislative, judicial, and constitutional reform. 80 This
was, as scholars were quick to point out, the first time that the Central Committee had ever directly
addressed the issue of “rule of law,” and seemed to elevate legal reform to an unprecedentedly
high political platform. 81 Despite its symbolic importance, the document was actually an ex post
acknowledgment of institutional work that had already begun many months before beforehand: by
the time of its issuance, the Party leadership had already made a number of major changes to the
judicial system.
One of the first issues addressed was the mundane but nonetheless critical problem of judge
compensation and personnel recruitment. The drive to increase judicial compensation reaches back
to at least the early 2000s, when it was first listed as an institutional objective in the Supreme
People’s Court’s (SPC) five-year work plans, but its intensity has increased substantially over the
past five years. 82 Around 2010, scholars, media outlets, and judges began to express concern that
the judiciary was increasingly incapable of attracting top-tier legal talent due to comparatively low
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published an entire symposium on the Fourth Plenum’s decision, http://nbr.org/publications/element.aspx?id=815.
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compensation levels—relative to both lawyers and, more alarmingly, other government
employees. 83 Although judges were technically on the same pay scale as other government
employees, the lower political stature of courts generally meant that their budgets were smaller,
and therefore that judges enjoyed fewer perquisites beyond their standard salaries: smaller bonuses
and less access to state-subsidized housing. 84 Morale was therefore low and personnel attrition
relatively high. 85
To be fair, this was a long-term problem—courts had flagged the attrition problem as early as 2004,
when they noted that they had lost 20,000 judges between 1998 and 2002, and judicial
compensation had always been comparatively low—but the Party leadership’s response had been
distinctly lukewarm during the Hu Jintao years, and no major changes were made. 86 Shortly after
Xi’s ascension, however, things had taken a sharp turn for the better: in 2014 and 2015, the Central
Leading Group for Deepening Overall Reform (CLGDOR), a policy formulation and
implementation body under the Politburo, issued a set of experimental measures expressly
designed to boost the attractiveness of judicial employment. 87 Most importantly, judge and
prosecutor salary levels would be detached from the standard government employee schedule and
placed on a higher plane. This dovetailed with another central campaign to establish fixed “judge
quotas” (faguan yuan’e zhi) that would reduce dramatically—by over a third—the number of
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Experiemental Reforms Concerning Legal Institutions] [hereinafter Framework Opinion], ZUTONGZI
[PUBLICATIONS OF THE CLGDOR] 2014-14; CLGDOR, Faguan, Jianchaguan Dandu Zhiwu Xulie Shidian Gaige
Fangan [Experimental Plan on Establishing an Independent Administrative Scale for Judges and Prosecutors]
[hereinafter Plan for Independent Administrative Scale], ZUTONGZI [PUBLICATIONS OF THE CLGDOR] 2015-36;
CLGDOR, Faguan, Jianchaguan Gongzi Zhidu Shidian Gaige Fangan [Experimental Plan on Salary Reform for
Judges and Prosecutors] [hereinafter Plan on Salary Reform], ZUTONGZI [PUBLICATIONS OF THE CLGDOR] 201537. The SPC’s implementation plans in response to these documents are summarized at Sifa Gaige Redian Wenda
[Questions and Answers on Hot Topics in Legal Reform], May 3, 2017, RENMIN FAYUAN BAO [PEOPLE’S COURT
DAILY] 2, available at http://rmfyb.chinacourt.org/paper/html/2017-05/03/content_125001.htm?div=-1. Note that in
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the primary body implementing legal reform.
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judges that could independently adjudicate cases. 88 Judges that were denied a position in the new
quotas would keep their old compensation levels, but would only be allowed to play a supporting
role in adjudication. 89 Essentially, these reforms aimed to reward high performers with
substantially higher salaries and greater responsibilities, while retaining other personnel in less
prestigious positions. Raising the prestige of judges would presumably attract more qualified
individuals into the judiciary, thereby expanding its legal expertise and adjudicatory capacity. 90
Once the basic principles were in place, implementation was swift: by early 2017, nearly 90
percent of judges nationwide were now subject to the new quota system. 91 By June of the same
year, 23 provincial-level regions had implemented the new judicial pay scale, with nation-wide
implementation soon to follow. 92 In some regions, judicial salaries now were some 40% higher
than other government officials of the same rank. Following these reforms, although complaints
about “losing talent” still appeared in the SPC’s yearly work reports, the language employed
became substantially milder: “some courts have suffered unusual losses of talent,” 93 rather than
“as a general matter, the loss of talent is a serious problem.” 94
The rise in compensation levels have allowed the courts to recruit more ambitiously. After the
previous major revision of the Judges’ Law in 2002, the baseline credentials needed to become a
judge were to hold a bachelor’s degree or above, have legal expertise, and have 1-3 years—
depending on which one’s educational level—of legal work experience. 95 Under special
circumstances, the law allows the SPC to authorize exceptions permitting the employment of
judges with only a vocational degree. 96 In late 2017, however, the National People’s Congress
announced plans to increase the minimum work experience requirement to 5 years, and to remove
the vocational degree exception altogether. 97
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On the history of these quotas, see Song Yongpan, Faguan Yuan’e Zhi jiqi Peizhi Jizhi Wenti Yanjiu [A Study of
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NATIONAL PEOPLE’S CONGRESS NET, http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/2017-11/01/content_2030821.htm (report
of the SPC Chief Justice to the NPCSC).
93
Zhou Qiang, Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Gongzuo Baogao [Annual Work Report of the Supreme People’s Court],
March 9, 2018, NATIONAL PEOPLE’S CONGRESS OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA OFFICIAL WEBSITE,
http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/dbdhhy/13_1/2018-03/26/content_2052568.htm (report of the SPC Chief Justice to the
full NPC).
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Wang Shengjun, Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Gongzuo Baogao [Annual Work Report of the Supreme People’s Court],
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Beyond these personnel-related reforms, the Party Leadership has also worked to fortify the SPC’s
administrative and legal control over lower level courts, with the apparent objective of
strengthening the consistency and quality of lower level adjudication. The primary means of
accomplishing this has been to establish six circuit courts, staffed by one justice and around a
dozen SPC judges, that each cover three to five provincial-level entities. 98 Beginning in early
2015, these circuit courts established offices in one of the provincial capitals within their
jurisdiction, and now exercise review powers over about a dozen categories of provincial-level
cases. 99 Their decisions hold the same legal authority as a regular SPC decision—in other words,
they have the final word on any case that comes before them—and they are administratively treated
as direct extensions of the Court. 100 Strictly speaking, the creation of circuit courts adds nothing
to the SPC’s jurisdiction—it already had appellate jurisdiction over all cases currently handled by
the circuit courts—but it nonetheless enhances its ability to monitor and control provincial and
local courts: the circuit courts specialize in one or two economic macroregions in ways that the
SPC itself generally cannot, and are therefore burdened with significantly lower information and
enforcement costs when dealing with lower courts.
Relatedly, the SPC has also stepped up its use of the relatively new “guiding cases” system to
control lower court behavior. Created in late 2010 and first utilized a year later, 101 the system
allows the SPC to identify certain case as “guiding cases” for lower level adjudication. Although
these are not quite “binding” in the same manner as are precedents in common law jurisdictions,
they nonetheless have a substantial amount of normative authority, and carry an expectation of
conformity. 102 Essentially, they share a similar function with formal judicial interpretations, but
are far easier and politically cheaper to issue. Since 2013, the volume of guiding cases issued by
the Court has increased by around 35 percent to some 16-18 a year. 103 Combined with the creation
of circuit courts, they provide the SPC with a substantially more powerful toolkit to strengthen
lower court compliance and adjudicative consistency.
Finally, the Party Leadership has also taken significant steps to bolster the judiciary’s enforcement
powers in civil disputes. A central feature in this regard is the creation of a Social Credit System,
announced in 2014 by the State Council. This ambitious and somewhat misunderstood effort
attempts to integrate currently disjointed sources of governmental information on private
98

Fu Yulin, Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Xunhui Fating de Zhineng Dingwei yu Quanwei Xingcheng [The Role and
Authority of the Circuit Courts of the Supreme People’s Court], 2014(4) CHINA. L. REV. 158.; Fang Le, Zuigao
Renmin Fayuan Xunhui Fating de Yunxing Jizhi [The Operational Institutions of the Circuit Courts of the Supreme
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Xinfang An [The Supreme People’s Court: Handles Nearly 60000 Enforcement Cases in the First Quarter, Circuit
Courts Handle Nearly 80 Percent of Xinfang Cases], May 7, 2018, THE PAPER,
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FA: DUOYUAN CHAYI YU JIQUAN TONGYI [THE LAW OF THE QING STATE: PLURALIST DIFFERENCES AND
AUTHORITARIAN UNIFICATION] (2d Ed., 2017), this was the first time a PRC court had been allowed to issue guiding
cases. Mark Jia, Note: Chinese Common Law? Guiding Cases and Judicial Reform, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2213.
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Jia, supra note 101.
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behavior—financial and business behavior, legal compliance, even some information on personal
ethics and character—into a score available for regulators and the public alike. 104 Loosely
designed on credit reporting systems in finance, the mechanism is far broader in scope and
concept. 105
The judiciary stands to reap enormous institutional benefits from this new information-sharing
infrastructure. Because private non-compliance with court orders and judgments are a core
component of the rating scheme, the Social Credit System essentially allows the judiciary to
outsource some of the enforcement of its decisions to other public entities, such as banks and
public transportation authorities. 106 While some scholars have raised fears that this will subject
some people to duplicative punishments, 107 for our purposes the crucial thing is that it will almost
certainly improve compliance with court judgements and orders. 108 It has, in fact, already led to
sanctions ranging from being barred from engaging in certain kinds of business and being denied
financial credit, to being prevented from boarding flights and playing golf. 109 In this way, the
judiciary has leveraged the resources of China’s powerful executive enforcement authority to
advance its own effectiveness, in turn making it a more attractive partner for other agencies.
Combined, this laundry list of reform measures has raised the judiciary’s institutional capacity,
professionalism, and internal coherence to perhaps unprecedented levels. Certainly at no other
point in PRC history has the SPC ever had this level of control over lower court adjudication, nor
have courts in the PRC ever been able to recruit highly educated legal professionals quite as
aggressively. Enforcement of judicial decisions has long been on a slow but steady upward trek
over the past few decades, but the creation of the credit score system promises to sharply accelerate
its progress.

B.

Institutional Independence

Whereas the last Section focused on the judiciary’s internal professionalism and coherence, the
following two sections turn their attention to its political status relative to other governmental and
Party entities. This section argues that it has become more independent from these entities,
whereas the next section argues that it has also gained greater authority to review their actions.
104
State Council of the People’s Republic of China, Shehui Xinyong Tixi Jianshe Guihua Gangyao [Principles of
Planning and Constructing a Social Credit System], 2014 GUOFA [PUBLICATIONS OF THE STATE COUNCIL] 21, Part
II.4, available at http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2014-06/27/content_8913.htm.
105
See Dai, supra note 21.
106
Indeed, the Supreme People’s Court was part of the Interministerial Joint Conference that developed the SCS
scheme laid out in 2014. And non-payment of judgments was one of the first areas in which the blacklist system was
laid out. Id.
107
Id., text at note 228.
108
Dai, supra note 21, at n. 277.
109
Id., at n. 278. This was facilitated by revisions of the Civil Litigation Law in 2012, providing that individuals
who did not carry out requirements of a court judgment could be barred from leaving the country, among other
vaguely worded sanctions. In 2013 the SPC created a blacklist of those who had not carried out court judgements or
administrative decisions. The blacklist is governed by procedures and a joint memorandum of understanding among
several agencies and party entities.
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Put together, these developments clearly indicate that the judiciary has made major external
political gains over the past five years, in addition to its internal institutional development.
Two developments that seemingly relate to the judiciary’s growing political independence have
already been mentioned in the previous section: the decline of top-down political pressure to
mediate, and the detachment of judicial compensation from the standard governmental scale. 110
That said, neither of these changes, on their own, truly indicate a major shift in the judiciary’s
political stature: although the Party Leadership has withdrawn the mediation-related pressures it
previously exerted, it nonetheless retains the political ability to reinstate it at any moment. In fact,
the Party Leadership’s control over the courts has arguably increased under Xi, as has its control
over all governmental and Party organs. 111 It has simply chosen not to exercise this control in
ways that interfere with legal professionalism. When we argue that the courts have become more
institutionally independent, we mean relative to political entities other than the Party Leadership:
in other words, we are focusing on horizontal, rather than vertical, independence. Within a oneparty system, this is precisely the dimension that matters most.
The creation of a separate judicial compensation scale, on the other hand, is a sign of growing
institutional independence, but only when combined with a different set of reforms that we have
yet to mention. Until very recently, the budgets of all courts were made by governmental entities
of the same level. Local, city, and provincial governments controlled the purse strings of lower
courts in the same way that the central government controlled the SPC’s budget, 112 allowing them
to exert an enormous amount of influence over judicial behavior. Since 2013, however, the Party
Leadership has implemented a number of measures designed to substantially reduce this influence,
primarily through removing all judicial budgetary decisions to the provincial level or above. 113
110

See discussion surrounding supra notes 77, 78, 87-90.
Shirk, supra note 1; Cohen, supra note 33; LI, supra note 19; Yuen, supra note 62; Fu, supra note 62; see also
Ling Li, The Chinese Communist Party and People’s Courts: Judical Dependence in China, 64 AM. J. COMP. L. 37
(2016).
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Xiaolü: Zhongguo Fayuan de Caizheng Baozhang yu Faguan Jili (司法成本与司法效率: 中国法院的财政保障与
法官激励) [Judicial Cost and Efficiency: The Securing of Finances and the Motivation of Judges in China’s
Courts], Faxuejia (法学家) [LEGAL SCHOLAR], no. 4, 2010, at 132, available at
http://www.civillaw.com.cn/article/default.asp?id=51198; Su Yongqin (苏永钦), Sifa Xingzheng Zuzhi de Fazhan
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审判独立与国家给付司法义务的紧张关系谈起) [Development Trends in the Administrative Organization of the
Judiciary: Starting from the Tense Relationship Between Judicial Independence and the State’s Obligation to
Financially Support the Judiciary], in Fazhi yu Xiandai Xingzheng Faxue (法治与现代行政法学) [THE RULE OF
LAW AND MODERN ADMINISTRATIVE LEGAL STUDIES] 45 (Yuanzhao Chubanshe [元照出版社] [Yuanzhao Press]
ed., 2004).
113
Zhonggong Zhongyang guanyu Quanmian Shenhua Gaige ruogan Zhongda Wenti de Jueding [Decision by the
Central Party Leadership on Comprehensively Deepening Several Reform Areas] [hereinafter Decision on
Deepening Reform], Nov. 15, 2013, CENTRAL PEOPLE’S GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
OFFICIAL WEBSITE, http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2013-11/15/content_2528179.htm (identifying the removal of judicial
budgets to the provincial level as a central area of reform); CLGDOR, Framework Opinion, supra note 87 (initiating
reforms to remove judicial budgets to the provincial level); sources cited at supra note 87.
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Without these broader fiscal changes, simply detaching judicial salaries from the usual government
compensation scale would have done very little for lower court independence—and, given the
traditional reluctance of local governments to fund judicial activity, 114 may not have resulted in
any systemic increase in judicial salaries at all.
It is therefore intuitive that the push for judicial financial independence began at the same time as
the initial floating of a separate judicial compensation scale—in the very same document, in fact.
In June 2014, the CLGDOR issued a set of “framework opinions” on experimenting with judicial
reform at the provincial level, which, following Chinese political convention, meant that several
provinces would implement experimental measures, followed by reassessment and potential
nation-wide implementation a few years later. 115 The opinions flagged the need to establish a
separate fiscal apparatus for judges and prosecutors, but provided few details, and it was not until
2015 that the Leading Group laid out concrete plans to create a separate pay scale. 116 What the
2014 opinion focused on instead was moving all judicial and procuratorial budget and personnel
decisions to the provincial level, in order to “solve the deeper structural problems that impede
judicial fairness and limit judicial capacity.” 117 Within a month, the SPC followed up with more
detailed measures in its fourth five-year work plan: provincial high courts would collaborate with
provincial governments to create judicial personnel commissions to determine all court-related
hiring and promotions, while the SPC itself would work with both central and provincial
authorities on budgetary reforms. 118 Three months later, the Fourth Plenum of the 18th Party
Congress formalized the framework opinions into official Party directives, 119 and by mid-2017,
the SPC reported that 18 provincial-level governments had completed the experimental reforms,
with nationwide implementation presumably only a few years away. 120
Although these measures fall short of full horizontal financial and personnel independence for
lower courts—at the very least, provincial and local courts remain financially dependent on
provincial governments—they nonetheless represent a major step forward from the status quo.
Compared to city or county level governments, provincial level governments are both more
detached from local adjudication and more sensitive to pressure from the center. 121 From the
perspective of the central government, there are over 2000 county-level entities under its control,
but only 31 provincial-level entities, excluding Hong Kong and Macau. 122 It goes without saying
114
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[Supreme People’s Court: 18 Provincial-Level Governments Have Completed Reforms Removing Judicial Budgets
and Personnel Decisions to the Provincial Level], July 3, 2017, THE PAPER,
https://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_1723657.
121
This is an obvious point, but for a general discussion on center-local relations in China, see YANG ZHONG, LOCAL
GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS IN CHINA: CHALLENGES FROM BELOW (2001).
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Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Quhua [Administrative Divisions of the People’s Republic of China],
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that the information and enforcement costs needed to ensure compliance at the former level is
exponentially higher than at the latter. Especially in the Xi Jinping era, central control over
provincial governance has escalated dramatically. 123
This assumes, of course, that the center does care about preventing provincial level officials from
interfering with lower courts: in March 2015, the Party leadership and the State Council jointly
issued a set of regulations designed specifically to cut down on political interference with judicial
activity at all levels. 124 Under these regulations, all courts would be required—under pain of
formal administrative sanction—to compile records of any undue political interference, whether
external or internal, and submit them to either a higher court or to the local Party Law and Political
Affairs Office (LPAO) for review and action. 125 The regulations also laid out basic investigatory
procedures and a fairly detailed set of penalties, including demotion, public shaming, removal of
party membership, and criminal prosecution. 126 Within a year of this initial announcement, most
provincial governments had published detailed plans to implement the regulations. 127
Unsurprisingly, the SPC was even more enthusiastic, following up with not only an
implementation plan, but also numerous directives to provincial courts to track and oversee local
progress. 128 By 2016, a number of officials had already been publicly shamed under the new
provisions, and many more had likely received internal sanction. 129
Placed within this broader regulatory context, the decision to remove judicial budgetary decisions
to the provincial level—rather than all the way to Beijing—more probably reflects the central
government’s confidence that it can contain provincial level interference, rather than any lack of
commitment to full horizontal judicial independence. Removal to Beijing would have entailed
vastly greater administrative costs in return for only a moderate boost to judicial independence,
which suggests that removal to the provincial level may very well have represented the optimal
balance.
123
Shirk, supra note 33; Elizabeth C. Economy, China’s Imperial President: Xi Jinping Tightens His Grip, 93
FOREIGN POL’Y 80 (2014).
124
Central Party Leadership Administrative Office & State Council Administrative Office, Lingdao Ganbu Ganyu
Sifa Huodong, Chashou Juti Anjian Chuli de Jilu, Tongbao he Zeren Zhuijiu [Regulations on Documenting,
Reporting, and Sanctioning Interference with Judicial Activity by Government Officials] [hereinafter Regulations
Against Interference], ZHONGBAN FA [PUBLICATIONS OF THE CENTRAL PARTY LEADERSHIP ADMINISTRATIVE
OFFICE] 2015-23 (March 30, 2015), available at http://www.xinhuanet.com/2015-03/30/c_1114812232.htm.
125
Id.
126
Id.
127
E.g., Sichuan Province Party Commission Administrative Office & Sichuan Province People’s Government
Adminstrative Office, Sichuan Sheng Lingdao Ganbu Ganyu Sifa Huodong, Chashou Juti Anjian Chuli de Jilu,
Tongbao he Zeren Zhuijiu Shishi Banfa [Implementation Methods on Documenting, Reporting, and Sanctioning
Interference with Judicial Activity by Sichuan Province Government Officials], August 1, 2016, available at
http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2016-08-16/doc-ifxuxhas2008596.shtml; Zhao Yang & Wei Lei, Guangdong dui
“Lingdao Ganbu Ganyu Sifa” Chu Xize [Guangdong Issues Detailed Rules on “Officials Intervening with Judicial
Work”], Nov. 7, 2015, THE PAPER, http://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_1393972.
128
Zhou Qiang, Fangzhi Lingdao Ganbu Ganyu Sifa Gongzuo Shuping [An Evaluation of Reform Measures Against
Officials Intervening with Judicial Work], Dec. 16, 2015, RENMIN FAYUAN BAO [PEOPLE’S COURT DAILY] 1,
available at http://www.court.gov.cn/shenpan-xiangqing-16333.html (summarizing measures taken by the SPC).
129
Shui zai Ganyu Sifa? Zhongzheng Wei Zaici Tongbao 7 Qi Dianxing Anli 20 Ren She’an [Who is Interfering with
Judicial Work? The Central Party Political Commission Again Publishes 7 Typical Cases Involving 20 People],
Feb. 1, 2016, XINHUA NET, http://www.xinhuanet.com/local/2016-02/01/c_1117960559.htm.
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All things considered, the Party leadership now seems strongly committed to shoring up the
judiciary’s institutional independence vis-a-vis all state and Party entities, but with the major
exception of itself. In fact, since Xi’s ascension, the SPC has expressly vowed to reject judicial
review and “constitutionalism under the Western model,” and to diligently follow “the Party’s
leadership.” 130 Properly understood, “the Party” referred to here is the central Party leadership in
Beijing, rather than Party offices of the same administrative level—lower Party offices are
expressly banned from interfering with judicial work under the 2015 regulations discussed
above 131 —but it nonetheless extinguishes any possibility of full judicial independence for the
foreseeable future.
That said, this exception is not quite as big a detriment to the judiciary’s functional independence
as it might seem at first glance: of any governmental entity within the Chinese Party-state, the
central Party leadership is arguably the most distant, and therefore the most detached, from the
day-to-day operation of courts. So long as it continues to support legal professionalism and overall
Party policy—and as discussed below, that is unlikely to change any time soon 132—the courts will
enjoy increasing levels of institutional independence as they gain financial security and regulatory
protection. The bottom line is that recent reforms have strengthened both judicial professionalism
and judicial independence.

C. Judicial Checks and Balances
Beyond the increase in judicial independence vis-à-vis most of the government, the past several
years have also seen a significant expansion of the judiciary’s authority to review and penalize
illegal administrative activity, making it a much more effective check against governmental abuse
and overreach. This area has seen less activity—and certainly less decisive activity—than those
discussed in the previous two sections, but that is simply because the political significance of
constructing judicial checks against governmental action is larger than merely promoting judicial
professionalism and independence. In both theory and practice, one can have the latter without
the former, but in such cases the judiciary will likely remain politically marginalized and confined
to narrow roles focused on society, rather than on the state. Until very recently, this was exactly
the strategy that the Party leadership pursued: with the partial exception of the Hu Jintao-era “turn
against law,” the Party at least maintained a consistent rhetorical commitment to judicial
professionalism—and for the most part, did indeed take steps to strengthen it. 133 The development
of judicial checks and balances, on the other hand, was both rhetorically and institutionally
muted. 134 Judicial constitutional review, for example, remains politically unthinkable, and the one
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Michael Forsythe, China’s Chief Justice Rejects an Independent Judiciary, and Reformers Wince, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 18, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/18/world/asia/china-chief-justice-courts-zhou-qiang.html.
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Regulations Against Interference, supra note 124.
132
See discussion at infra pp. _-_.
133
Clarke, supra note 48; Peerenboom, supra note 1.
134
Li, supra note 45; He, supra note 46; He, supra note 45; HOU MENG, ZUIGAO RENMIN FAYUAN YANJIU: YI SIFA
DE YINGXIANGLI QIERU [A STUDY OF THE SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT OF CHINA: FROM THE ANGLE OF JUDICIAL
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fledging attempt by the SPC to apply constitutional principles in adjudication—the 2001 Qi Yuling
case—drew such a strong rebuke that the SPC formally withdrew that interpretation in 2008. 135
The passage of the Administrative Litigation Law (ALL) in 1989 was arguably the only substantial
step forward in this area throughout the pre-Xi Jinping era, 136 but it was nonetheless a very limited
step. As scholars have long argued, the ALL gave the courts very limited jurisdiction to review
administrative activity—only over eight specific categories of individual administrative
enforcement, and none over administrative regulations that possess any kind of “general binding
force.” 137 Combine this with a general ban on mediation in administrative cases, which excluded
a number of potentially pro-plaintiff litigation strategies, and it is altogether unsurprising that the
total volume of administrative cases experienced fairly little growth after 1998, when the impact
of the ALL’s initial passage seemed to plateau at around 100,000 cases a year. 138 The courts
themselves, still vulnerable to financial and personnel interference from local governments, were
reluctant to take on these cases, and reports abounded of lower courts that refused to accept
otherwise legitimate case filings. 139
Placed within this context, the 2014 revision of the ALL represents the most substantial expansion
of judicial checks and balances in at least 25 years. 140 Issued a few months later after the
aforementioned directive to boost judicial financial independence, the revision focused on two
major issues: first, it sought to lower external political interference with administrative litigation;

INFLUENCE] (2007); Zhang, supra note 38; Eric Ip, Article: The Supreme People’s Court and the Political Economy
of Judicial Empowerment in Contemporary China, 24 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 367 (2011).
135
Tong, supra note 37; Kellogg, supra note 37.
136
ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO XINGZHENG SUSONG FA [ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE LAW OF THE PEOPLE’S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA] [hereinafter ALL], as amended on June 27, 2017, available at
http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/2017-06/29/content_2024894.htm.
137
Minxin Pei, Citizens v. Mandarins: Administrative Litigation in China, 152 CHINA Q. 832 (1997); Ginsburg,
Administrative Law and the Judicial Control of Agents in Authoritarian Regimes, in RULE BY LAW, supra note 27,
at 58; He, supra note 45.
138
Taisu Zhang, Why the Chinese Prefer Administrative Petitioning Over Litigation, 2009 Soc. Stud. 139. To put
this number in perspective, it was roughly comparable to the number of “social disturbances”—a euphemism for
riots and protests—reported by the government during the same period. CHRISTIAN GOEBEL & LYNETTE H. ONG,
SOCIAL UNREST IN CHINA 37 (Long Briefing, Europe China Research and Academic Network, 2012), available at
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Asia/1012ecran_gobelong.pdf [last accessed July
20, 2018].
139
Jiang Bixin, Wanshan Xingzheng Susong Zhidu de Ruogan Sikao [Thoughts on How to Perfect the Administrative
Litigation System], 2013(1) ZHONGGUO FAXUE [CHINESE LEGAL STUD.] 5.
140
National People’s Congress Standing Committee, Guanyu Xugai Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng
Susong Fa de Jueding [Decision on Revising the Administrative Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China]
[hereinafter 2014 ALL Revision], Nov. 1, 2014, NATIONAL PEOPLE’S CONGRESS OFFICIAL WEBSITE,
http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/2014-11/02/content_1884662.htm. A minor revision in 2017 gave prosecutors
the authority to bring administrative suits against other governmental entities in cases concerning environmental
protection, food and drug safety, used of state-owned assets, and the transfer of state-owned property usage rights.
National People’s Congress Standing Committee, Guanyu Xugai Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Minshi Susong Fa
he Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Susong Fa de Jueding [Decision on Revising the Civil Procedure Law
of the People’s Republic of China and the Administrative Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China], June
27, 2017, NATIONAL PEOPLE’S CONGRESS OFFICIAL WEBSITE, http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/201706/27/content_2024517.htm.
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and, second, it substantially expanded the scope of the judiciary’s review power. 141 The former
was, as noted above, part of a general push to eliminate political interference 142—except by the
Party leadership itself—but it was a particularly pressing problem in the context of administrative
litigation, where governmental incentives to intervene were often at their highest. 143 In response,
the revised ALL incorporated a new “general principle” that specifically banned external
interference of all kinds, and also mandated that courts “should protect the right of citizens, legal
persons, and other organizations to lawfully initiate litigation, and must therefore lawfully accept
all cases that it should accept.” 144 The latter clause, despite its somewhat circular phrasing,
formally eliminates whatever discretion courts originally thought they had to turn away
“undesirable” cases: not only were lawmakers removing external obstacles against judicial review,
but they also wanted to make sure courts exercised it more often.
The expansion of scope was accomplished through adding four more categories of administrative
action that were now specifically subject to judicial review: administrative decisions concerning
ownership or usage rights over land and some other natural resources; any exercise of eminent
domain; any interference by a governmental entity on agricultural land use rights; and any issuance
of compensation following an act of eminent domain. 145 The common issue underlying these new
categories is the conversion of agricultural land into urban real estate: in general, this can only be
accomplished through an act of eminent domain exercised by an appropriate governmental
entity. 146 Lower-level governments are usually extremely eager to convert rural land for urban
use, both because of its enormous benefit to short-term GDP growth, and because it is now a
critically important source of revenue. 147 On the other hand, rural collectives and landholders—
who respectively hold ownership and usage rights over all agricultural land—are often severely
undercompensated in such proceedings, making them arguably the single largest source of rural
and suburban social unrest in China. 148 In other words, the new ALL not only expanded the
judiciary’s administrative review power, but in such a way to address one of China’s most serious
sociopolitical problems.
141

2014 ALL Revision, supra note 140. The new ALL also gave the courts some more flexibility in how to handle
administrative cases, but the increase was marginal. Whereas court-directed mediation was formally banned in all
forms, the revisions now allowed mediation in administrative compensation cases and other disputes in which the
defendant—that is, the government entity being sued—possessed some measure of discretionary judgment power.
Id.
142
See discussion at supra p._.
143
He Haibo, Xingzheng Susong Chesu Kao [A Study of Withdrawal in Administrative Litigation Cases], 2001(2)
ZHONGWAI FAXUE [PEKING UNIV. L.J.] 129.; He Haibo, Kundun de Xingzheng Susong [Administrative Litigation in
Difficult Times], 2012(2) HUADONG ZHENGFA DAXUE XUEBAO [J. OF THE EAST CHINA UNIVERSITY OF POLITICAL
SCIENCE AND LAW] 57.
144
2014 ALL Revision, supra note 140.
145
Id. It should be noted that a considerable expansion of the scope of judicial review of administrative action had
already been effectuated by the Supreme People’s Court’s Interpretation (promulgated in 2000) on Several
Questions regarding the Implementation of the Law of Administrative Litigation, which expanded coverage to most
concrete administrative actions affecting citizens’ rights and interests. ALBERT H.Y. CHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO
THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (4th ed. 2011), at 297)
146
Taisu Zhang & Xiaoxue Zhao, Do Kinship Networks Strengthen Private Property? Evidence From Rural China,
11 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 505 (2014)
147
Id.
148
Id.
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One could argue that the power to review eminent domain was already implicit in the eight
categories recognized by the previous ALL—specifically, in the relatively vague category of
“administrative actions that affect other personal and property rights” 149—but explicit recognition
makes an enormous difference in the practical application of Chinese law. Prior to the 2014
revision, there was genuine debate within the legal world over whether, and to what extent, the
ALL covered rural land takings: in practice, at least, both lower courts and other governmental
entities were often resistant to such coverage, and higher courts were generally unwilling to
systemically push back. 150 Scholarly opinion seemed to tentatively coalesce around the shapeless
position that whether any specific incident was covered by the ALL depended on its severity and
scale, but there was ultimately little legal authority to support it.151 The 2014 revisions put an end
to these debates and immediately generated a significant increase in the volume of land takingsrelated litigation—within two years of its passage, some government observers claimed that they
were now “the primary source” of administrative cases in some jurisdictions. 152
Following these changes, the overall volume of Chinese administrative litigation shot upward from
some 130,000 cases closed in 2014 to around 200,000 in 2015, and then to almost 240,000 in
2017. 153 At the same time, victory rates for plaintiffs in these cases, which had tumbled
downwards for nearly a decade prior to the revision, until falling below 10 percent in 2013, moved
back up to around 15 percent in 2016, suggesting that external political interference had indeed
receded somewhat. 154 In another public display of the Party leadership’s new commitment to
constraining lower-level governmental entities through administrative litigation, the People’s
Daily immediately cheered these new developments as major sign of progress: “any minor increase
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ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO XINGZHENG SUSONG FA [ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE LAW OF THE PEOPLE’S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA], as enacted on Apr. 4, 1989, available at http://www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/wxzl/200012/05/content_4519.htm.
150
Zhang Yu, Nongcun Tudi Zhengshou Buchang Jiufen Xingzheng Susong Anjian Tanxi [An Exploration of
Administrative Litigation Cases Related to Rural Land Takings Compensation], Oct. 8 2012, ZHONGGUO FAYUAN
WANG, JIANGXI SHENG JIUJIANG SHI ZHONGJI RENMIN FAYUAN [OFFICIAL WEBSITE OF THE JIUJIANG INTERMEDIATE
PEOPLE’S COURT, CHINA COURT NET], http://jjzy.chinacourt.org/article/detail/2012/10/id/2606044.shtml.
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Plausibility of Litigating Administrative Action in Rural Collective Land Takings], Jan. 6, 2017, WUSONG YUEDU,
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a member of the Legal Office of the Changsha City Government].
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Qiang, 2018 Work Report, supra note 93; Zhou Qiang, Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Gongzuo Baogao [Annual Work
Report of the Supreme People’s Court], March 21, 2016, SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT OF CHINA OFFICIAL WEBSITE,
http://www.court.gov.cn/zixun-xiangqing-17712.html (2016 work report); Zhou Qiang, Zuigao Renmin Fayuan
Gongzuo Baogao [Annual Work Report of the Supreme People’s Court], March 15, 2015, SUPREME PEOPLE’S
COURT OF CHINA OFFICIAL WEBSITE, http://gongbao.court.gov.cn/Details/41bf882b379cb6f24540decdf70250.html
(2015 work report).
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Li Yingfeng, Min Gao Guan Shengsulü Shangsheng Shifang Jiji Xinhao [The Rise of Plaintiffs’ Victory Rates in
Administrative Litigation Sends a Positive Signal], June 15, 2017, FAZHI RIBAO [LEGAL DAILY] at 3, available at
http://opinion.people.com.cn/n1/2017/0615/c1003-29340775.html; Zhang Yu, Zhongguo “Min Gao Guan” An
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in the loss rate for administrative entities in the courts,” it crowed, “represents a major step forward
for judicial work.” 155
Even after these changes, judicial review of governmental activity remains fairly weak. The
number of cases remains small for a country of China’s size, and courts are still prohibited from
reviewing general rules and regulations. 156 But the upward trend in ambit and scale of review
activity is unmistakable, and will likely persist into the foreseeable future. The SPC, for example,
issued yet another set of judicial interpretations on the ALL in early 2018 and once again expanded
the judiciary’s jurisdiction, this time by, first, resolving in the affirmative a long-time debate
among government entities over whether courts could review village-level administrative actions
under the ALL and, second, allowing courts to compel local governmental entities of the same
level to issue formal explanations for any informal political decision. 157 The latter, in particular,
has drawn academic attention as a way for courts to potentially influence and constrain
administrative regulations of “general binding force.” 158 The judiciary can now realistically claim
to be a central component of Xi Jinping’s general campaign to “place (governmental) power within
a cage.” 159 Although that campaign—discussed in greater detail in Part III—has largely been
focused against corruption, 160 both the courts and other governmental organs have increasingly
advocated administrative litigation as another important bar in the “cage,” 161 and as the judiciary
steps further into that role, its relative political stature will continue to rise.

D. How Legalistic are Chinese Courts?
Looking back at the developments laid out in the previous sections, 2014 clearly was an
enormously significant turning point for the Chinese judiciary. Prior to that point, it had just
undergone a five-year stretch in which central authorities were, by many accounts, systematically
diluting its core adjudicative function and lessening its professional prestige. Whatever the merits
of that description, judicial morale was indeed low, as the institutional problems that had plagued
courts for decades showed no signs of improving, and may even have been deteriorating further. 162
155

Yingfeng, supra note 154.
ALL, supra note 136, at art. 13.
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Supreme People’s Court of China, Xingzheng Susong Fa Sifa Jieshi [Interpretation of the Administrative
Procedure Law], Feb. 7, 2018, SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT OF CHINA OFFICIAL WEBSITE,
http://www.court.gov.cn/zixun-xiangqing-80542.html. On the previous debate over jurisdiction, see He Xin, Why
did they not take on the disputes? Law, Power and Politics in the Decision-Making of Chinese Courts, 3 INT’L J.L.
CONTEXT 203 (2007)
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Cui, Cheng & Wiesner, Judicial Review of Government Actions in China (2018).
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Supreme People’s Court of China, Shi ge Jingji Xingzheng Dianxing Anli [Ten Model Cases on Economic and
Administrative Litigation], Oct. 22, 2015, SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT OF CHINA OFFICIAL WEBSITE,
http://www.court.gov.cn/zixun-xiangqing-15843.html [hereinafter SPC, Ten Model Cases]
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Longzi li [“The Cage Theory”: Putting Power in an Institutional Cage], Sep. 7, 2015, PEOPLE’S DAILY NET,
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The first year of Xi Jinping’s rule, 2013, had offered a change in rhetoric, 163 but it was not until
2014 that a huge wave of institutional reforms happened almost all at once, spearheaded by the
CLGDR’s framework opinions and the revision of the ALL. 164 As a result, courts are now more
professional, independent, and politically powerful than at any point in PRC history. Of course,
they remain far weaker in most respects than their American or Western European counterparts,
and may very well never the power of constitutional review, but sweeping, paradigm-shifting
progress in judicial professionalism and independence has indeed been made under an increasingly
centralized and autocratic regime.
These reforms are almost certainly responsible—partially, at least—for the dramatic increase in
judicial caseload over the past 5 years. Intuitively, the more professional and independent the
courts are, the more effective and fair they will be in adjudicating socioeconomic disputes, and,
assuming that there is consistent social demand for such services, the greater their caseload will
likely be. 165 This has indeed been the case: since 2014, with the major exception of criminal cases,
the judiciary has experienced unusually explosive growth in its caseload. Civil and commercial
cases now exceed 12 million a year, nearly double the 6-7 million cases it was handling yearly
before 2014. 166 In comparison, the annual civil and commercial caseload only grew by around 1.5
million cases across the entire Hu Jintao era (2003-2013). 167 Administrative litigation, as noted
above, has shown a similar trend—not to mention that the courts have been able to handle all this
while reducing the number of judges authorized to directly adjudicate by some 40 percent. By all
indications, the courts operate much more efficiently and effectively now than they used to, and
the general public seems to have responded by litigating much more aggressively.
Some scholars might argue that bolstering the institutional status and independence of the courts
does not necessarily amount to a “turn towards law” or any major shift in central policy towards
legality. Chinese courts have struggled with judicial fairness in the past, favoring parties with
163
Xi Jinping Pledges to Implement Rule of Law, CHINA DAILY (Dec. 5, 2012),
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2012-12/05/content_15985873.htm ( “To fully implement the Constitution
needs to be the sole task and the basic work in building a socialist nation ruled by law”). See discussion
surrounding supra notes 76-78 .
164
Framework Opinion, supra note 87; ALL, supra note 136.
165
As some economists will doubtlessly point out, if people are completely rational, information costs nonexistent,
and the courts ompletely predictable—predictability being a side-effect of professionalism—then no one would sue.
Instead, parties would know beforehand what the outcome of a case would be, and would bargain on that basis. In
that case, there might actually be a negative relationship between judicial professionalism and the volume of
litigation. Needless to say, none of these conditions exist in China today, and nearly all legal actors, including the
judiciary, tend to assume that rising caseloads correlates to more effective adjudication (or at least the social
perception of effective adjudication). E.g., Zhou Qiang, 2018 Report, supra note 93. The underlying assumptions
seem to be that the overall socioeconomic demand for dispute resolution is either stable or rising due to
commercialization and demographic mobility, and if adjudication were widely perceived to be ineffective, then
parties would simply settle their disputes through other means.
166
Qiang, 2015 Report, supra note 93; Qiang, 2018 Report, supra note 93.
167
Xiao Yang, Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Gongzuo Baogao [Annual Work Report of the Supreme People’s Court],
March 11, 2003, SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT OF CHINA OFFICIAL WEBSITE,
http://gongbao.court.gov.cn/Details/54e6bcf2941a766a043afde548717a.html; Wang Shengjun, Zuigao Renmin
Fayuan Gongzuo Baogao [Annual Work Report of the Supreme People’s Court], March 10, 2013, SUPREME
PEOPLE’S COURT OF CHINA OFFICIAL WEBSITE,
http://gongbao.court.gov.cn/Details/9f1655cc4ce302bc9a1ef28902f9c0.html.
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strong political connections or economic backgrounds over those that do not—but if the courts
themselves are insufficiently committed to legality, then strengthening them may not amount to a
strengthening of law. 168 That is, if courts become stronger and more effective, it is possible that
they are becoming more effective at something other than applying the law. Governmental rhetoric
may speak aspirationally of legal professionalism, but in reality, the courts may ignore legal rules
as much as any other governmental organ—and even if the Chinese population is litigating in everincreasing numbers, perhaps what it wants from the courts is not enforcement of legal rules, but
something more “culturally Chinese.” 169
We consider such skepticism severely overblown. Scholars who study Chinese courts have
generally agreed that, in the vast majority of cases, and specifically in nearly all civil and
commercial cases, courts tend to operate in a highly professional, law-oriented manner. 170 The
sheer caseload that lower courts face on a day-to-day basis renders extralegal behavior too costly
to bear on any regular basis. The basic fact that richer or more politically connected litigants
systemically fare better in courts does not distinguish Chinese courts from nearly any other court
system in the world. 171 For the most part, these patterns are readily explained by the fact that
richer or more powerful litigants simply possess superior resources and therefore better access to
legal counsel, rather than by any conscious rule-bending on behalf of the courts.
As for the small minority of socially or politically charged cases where the courts are under
significant outside pressure to reach specific outcomes, 172 the overwhelming direction of post2014 reforms has been to reduce such pressure, and at least some of these reforms, specifically
those related to court finances and personnel, have almost certainly had positive and substantial
effects. The design imperfections in the World Bank’s Rule of Law Governance Indicator are well
known, 173 but it bears mention that China’s Rule of Law rank has, following a significant decrease
during the later Hu Jintao era, increased every single year under Xi, and has now reached new
168
For such accusations, see, for example, LUBMAN, BIRD IN A CAGE, supra note 1; Clarke, supra note 45; Li Ling,
The “Production” of Corruption in China’s Courts: Judicial Politics and Decision Making in a One-Party State, 37
L. & SOC. INQUIRY 848 (2012); Pitman B. Potter, Guanxi and the PRC Legal System: From Contradiction to
Complementarity, in SOCIAL CONNECTIONS IN CHINA: INSTITUTIONS, CULTURE, AND THE CHANGING NATURE OF
GUANXI 179 (Thomas Gold, Doug Guthrie & David Wank eds., 2002); Xin He & Kwai Hang Ng, It Must Be Rock
Strong: Guanxi’s Impact on Judicial Decision Making in China, 65 Am. J. Comp. L. 841 (2017); Xin He & Yang
Su, Do the “Haves” Come Out Ahead in Shanghai Courts, 10 J. EMPIRICAL L. STUD. 120 (2013).
169
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170
Fu, supra note 1; He, supra note 46, at 132 (“[Studies] are generally consistent with the analysis that enforcement
of relevant laws is taking place and local protectionism is not rampant.”)
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L. VOLCANSEK, MARIA ELISABETTA DE FRANCISCIS & JACQUELINE LUCIENNE LAFON, JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT: A
CROSS-NATIONAL COMPARISON (1996)
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Fu Hualing, Mapping Terrorist Threats in China and the Political and Legal Responses (2010) (developing a
typology of cases that involve external political pressure); Li, supra note 45; Rachel Stern, The Political Logic of
China’s New Environmental Courts, 72 CHINA J. 53 (2014).
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heights. At the very least, this indicates a general sense among legal professionals that Chinese
courts are indeed applying the law now in a significantly more rigorous and predictable manner. 174
Past problems, however deep and serious, do not mean that current attempts to resolve them are
either insincere or ineffective. Whether China is currently experiencing a “turn towards law”
depends ultimately on whether the current regime is serious about promoting professional law
enforcement and adjudication, not on whether previous regimes did a good job in this area, and
there is no good reason to believe that the current Party leadership is anything but extremely serious.
The sheer amount of administrative resources thrown into judicial reform in the few years since
2014 likely dwarfs comparable investment across the entire Hu Jintao-era. As more than one
scholar has noted, some of these reforms, most notably the fiscal and personnel reforms, require
immense institutional change and have encountered substantial opposition175—and yet, by 2018,
substantial progress has been made on nearly all fronts.
Then there are the institutional incentives of the judiciary itself: the judiciary, and especially the
SPC, has probably been the strongest and most consistent supporter of legal professionalism in
China—even during the Hu Jintao era “turn against law”—for the very straightforward and
pragmatic reason that it has the most to gain from it. 176 Legal expertise and professionalism are
ultimately what distinguish the courts from other branches of the government, and are therefore
their primary source of sociopolitical prestige. As the judiciary becomes more cohesive, welleducated, and legally experienced, it would be extremely surprising if it voluntarily moved away
from reliable law-based adjudication, especially when the Party Leadership itself seems to be
promoting higher levels of legal professionalism.
Finally, we would also strongly disagree with any suggestion that the general population does not
care about legal professionalism. As discussed in greater detail below, evidence from the past
decade strongly suggests that it does care, and to such an extent that a serious lack of legal
professionalism in the courts would be a fundamental threat to the Party-state’s sociopolitical
legitimacy. 177 The best interpretation of the developments presented in this section is simply the
most intuitive one: that the courts have become more legally professionalized, independent, and
powerful, that the general population has rewarded them with a dramatically higher rate of usage
and socioeconomic importance—and, therefore, that this almost certainly constitutes a major turn
towards greater legality in Chinese governance.

174

Another source of corroborating data is the World Justice Project, https://worldjusticeproject.org/ (last visited
July 26, 2018), which surveys thousands of citizens in over 100 countries on many dimensions of the justice
system—and largely reaffirms the findings of the Rule of Law Governance Indicator. It has shown improvements
over the Xi era, with impressions of judicial corruption and governmental interference in the courts falling
significantly.
175
See, e.g., Minzner, Legal Reform, supra note 1; deLisle, supra note 1; Clarke, supra note 1.
176
See, e.g., HOU MENG, ZUIGAO RENMIN FAYUAN YANJIU: YI SIFA DE YINGXIANGLI QIERU [A STUDY OF THE
SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT OF CHINA: FROM THE ANGLE OF JUDICIAL INFLUENCE] (2007); Zhang, supra note 38;
Eric Ip, supra note 134; Tong, supra note 37 (discussing the SPC’s motivations behind the Qi Yuling case); He,
supra note 45.
177
See discussion at infra pp. _-_.
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III.

Engaging the Constitution

The judiciary is not the only legal institution that has experienced a major increase in political
status under the Xi Jinping regime. We argue in this part that the Chinese Constitution, long
thought to be an insignificant and politically dormant document, 178 has also experienced such a
status boost, both in terms of governmental rhetoric and in terms of actual political activity. Within
the institutional framework of Party-state, the judiciary and the Constitution are functionally
unrelated entities due to the former’s lack of constitutional interpretation powers, but as argued
below, there are common sociopolitical forces that underlie the political rise of both. They
represent different dimensions of a general shift in socioeconomic demand—and, in response,
political movement—towards institutional regularity, accountability, and, ultimately, legality.
We argue here that the Constitution already carries much more political weight than scholars have
previously given it credit for, indeed at the highest levels of the Party-state, and that recent
developments have only further bolstered its influence and significance. 179 Much of this argument
rests upon our analysis—the first of its kind in any kind of academic publication—of the 2018
constitutional amendments, but we also place great emphasis on the post-2012 buildup to that
moment, which allow interesting glimpses into what we believe has been a long-term trend in
Chinese politics.
To be clear, we are not arguing that these recent developments amount, in any way, to a rise of
“constitutionalism” in Chinese politics. 180 There is little evidence to suggest that the Party
leadership has internalized the normative authority of the Constitution in any fashion, and the rigor
and impact of constitutional review remains, for now, as poor as it has always been. “Western
style constitutionalism” remains a concept non grata, as does any notion of creating formal checks
against the Party leadership’s power. 181 Nonetheless, we do believe there is evidence that the
document has become more instrumentally important: that is, emphasizing its authority now brings
greater political benefits than in the not-so-distant past, whereas disregarding it now carries much
greater political cost. Party leaders need not have normatively internalized any version of
constitutionalism for this to happen.

A.

A Change in Rhetoric

The Constitution has always occupied an awkward position in Chinese political discourse. Since
the 1980s, a significant number of Party elites have clearly believed that, for reasons related to
both internal political coordination and external image, the country needed a visible and at least
178

See sources cited at supra note 54.
But see Clarke, supra note. 48, at 103-09 (explaining that the Constitution has a legitimating function despite its
legal irrelevance).
180
Compare Backer, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined. (using the constitutionalism term to describe
China).
181
Forsythe, supra note 130; Economy, supra note 19, at 37-38.
179
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potentially respectable Constitution.182 At the same time, the document’s nominal guarantee of
basic rights and freedoms, although provided for in highly ambiguous and malleable language,
was nonetheless inconvenient for an autocratic regime. 183 Functionally, formal constitutional
review, if it existed at all, was at best unpredictable and usually insignificant. 184 Constitutional
amendment was used to ratify policy decisions that had already been reached, and to bless
ideological formulae that had been adopted by the party. For example, in 1993 Deng’s formula of
“socialism with Chinese characteristics” was added to the preamble, and in 2004, Jiang Zemin’s
“Three Represents” was added, along with formal protection of property rights—which, at that
point, had already been in statutory existence for years. 185
Rhetorically, Party leaders did mention the Constitution occasionally in speeches and essays, but
almost always superficially. For example, Hu Jintao used the term “Constitution” in some 25
speeches over his 10 years of rule, but apart from an early speech delivered on the 20th anniversary
of the 1982 Constitution, never discussed it in any substantial way. 186
Xi has diverged from this pattern in terms of both frequency and substance. He has mentioned the
term almost as many times in just 5 years at the helm as Hu did in 10, but much more importantly,
has made it the centerpiece of at least six speeches and essays, as early as 2012 and as recent as
2018. 187 The language employed is usually generic—for example, “the Constitution is our
182

William C. Jones, The Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, 63 WASH. U. L. Q. 707 (1985); Richard
Baum, Modernization and Legal Reform in Post-Mao China:The Rebirth of Socialist Legality, 19 STUD. COMP.
COMMUNISM 69 (1986); Hungdah Chiu, The 1982 Chinese Constitution and the Rule of Law, 11 REV. SOCIALIST L.
143 (1985).
183
See sources cited at supra note 54.
184
Lin & Ginsburg, supra note 59.
185
CONSTITUTION OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (as amended on March 14, 2004), available at
http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Constitution/node_2825.htm. On the development of property rights in China,
see Donald Clarke, China’s Stealth Urban Land Revolution, 62 AM. J. COMP. L. 323 (2014).
186
Hu Jintao, Zai Shoudu Gejie Jinian Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xianfa Gongbu Shishi Ershi Zhounian Dahui
shang de Jianghua [Speech Delivered at the Beijing Meeting to Commemorate the 20th Anniversary of the
Enactment of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China], 2002(1) GAOXIAO LILUN ZHANXIAN
[BATTLELINES OF THEORY IN HIGHER LEARNING] 1. The total speech count is a rough number derived from
searching for articles authored by 胡锦涛 (Hu Jintao) in Google Scholar, https://scholar.google.com/, using the
keyword 宪法 (constitution).
187
Guanyu Xianfa, Xi Jinping zhe 10 ju Hua Fa Ren Shenxing [On the Constitution, These 10 Lines in Xi Jinping’s
Speeches Inspire Deep Reflection], March 12, 2018, XINHUA NET, http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/201803/12/c_1122527222.htm (identifying 10 important statements on the Constitution derived from four of Xi’s
speeches); Xi Jinping, Zai Shoudu Gejie Jinian Xianxing Xianfa Gongbu Shishi 30 Zhounian Dahui Shang de
Jianghua [Speech in the Capital Commemorating the 30th Anniversary of the Promulgation and Implementation of
the 1982 Constitution (Dec. 4, 2012), XINHUA NET http://news.xinhuanet.com/ politics/201212/04/c_113907206.htm, translation at http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/ 2013/05/xi-jingpings-constitutionalvision.html; Xi Jinping, Weihu Xianfa Quanwei, Tuijin Xianzheng Fazhan [Protect the Constitution’s Authority,
Promote the Development of Constitutionalism], 2013(1) JIGOU YU XINGZHENG [INSTITUTIONS AND
ADMINISTRATION] 1, available at http://www.cqvip.com/qk/71320x/2013001/74718890504849514849484850.html;
Xi Jinping, Keshou Xianfa Yuanze, Hongyang Xianfa Jingshen, Lüxing Xianfa Shiming [Obey the Constitution’s
Principles, Enhance the Constitution’s Spirit, Realize the Constitution’s Destiny], 2012(24) RENMIN JIANCHA [THE
PEOPLE’S PROCURATORATE] 1, available at http://www.cqvip.com/qk/81238x/201224/44414056.html. The total
speech count is a rough number derived from searching for articles authored by 习近平 (Xi Jinping) in Google
Scholar, https://scholar.google.com/, using the keyword 宪法 (constitution).
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fundamental law, the principle guideline for stable and peaceful rule, and the concentrated
manifestation of the Party’s and the People’s will” 188—but he has clearly displayed a far stronger
and more consistent interest in publicly valorizing the document than his predecessors did.
The rest of the Chinese political and intellectual elite has clearly caught on. Sociopolitical
discourse on the Constitution and socialist constitutionalism (“xianzheng”) has increased
substantially since 2012. 189 A crude but effective measure of this is the frequency of discussion
in major political newspapers: for example, the word “Constitution” appeared in some 4500
People’s Daily articles during Hu Jintao’s 10-year reign, but appeared in roughly 2800 articles
during the first 5 years of Xi’s rule, which represents a frequency increase of around 30%. 190
Picking up on Xi’s apparent interest in the concept, a highly unusual public debate, arguably the
only one of its kind in PRC history, over constitutionalism broke out in the Chinese media,
including several state-run or Party-run outlets, from 2012 to 2013, drawing widespread interest
from scholars, judges, and government officials. 191 Participants staked out positions that ranged
from the mainstream and conventional—that “socialist constitutionalism” was desirable, but full
blown “Western” constitutionalism was not—to the more extreme—either that China should adopt
liberal constitutionalism, complete with judicial review, or that any form of constitutionalism
would amount to a “color revolution” and therefore destroy the Party’s rule. 192 For the most part,
the moderate view seemed to dominate. Even the most established Party newspapers ran op-eds
that offered qualified support for “ruling the country according to the Constitution.” 193 Although
this kind of language was not qualitatively unprecedented, the mere fact that such high-profile
public debate was allowed to run its course for over a year and, in the end, trend towards a
moderately pro-constitution position nevertheless suggested a significant measure of government
tolerance, and almost certainly boosted the Constitution’s social visibility. 194
Several months after the debate wound down, Xi again sparked widespread social interest in the
constitution by openly declaring that “the Constitution is our country’s fundamental law.
Governing the country by law means, most importantly, governing it according to the Constitution;
wielding political power by law means, most importantly, wielding it according to the
188

Guanyu Xianfa, supra note187.
Creemers, supra note 28.
190
These numbers are derived from a quick search for 宪法 (constitution), in the PEOPLE’S DAILY TEXT AND IMAGE
DATABASE, http://data.people.com.cn/rmrb/20180714/1?code=2, using the date parameters Nov. 8, 2002-Nov. 7,
2012, and Nov. 8, 2012-Nov. 7, 2017.
191
Creemers, supra note 28; Kellogg, supra note 28.
192
Zheng Yongnian (郑永年), Zhongguo de Xianzheng Zhi Zheng Shuoming le Shenme? (中国的‘宪政’之争说明了
什么?_) [What Does China’s ‘Constitutional Governance’ Debate Mean?], AI SIXIANG (爱思想) [LOVE THOUGHT]
(June 18, 2013), http://www.aisixiang.com/data/64914.html; For China to Rise, so Must Status of Its Constitution,
CAIXIN ONLINE (Dec. 12, 2012), http://english.caixin.com/2012-12-12/100471777.html; Kellogg, (2015), supra note
28, at 367-97.
193
Qiu Shi, Gonggu Dang He Renmin Tuanjie Fendou de Gongtong Sixiang Jichu [Consolidate the Common
Intellectual Foundation of the United Struggle of the Party and the People], QIU SHI [SEEKING TRUTH] (Oct. 16,
2013), http://www.qstheory.cn/zxdk/2013/201320/201310/t20131012_278250.htm; Guo Ping, Yixian Zhizheng yu
Xifang Xianzheng Burong Hunxiao [Governing According to the Constitution Must Not Be Confused with
Western ‘Constitutionalism,’], RENMIN RIBAO [PEOPLE’S DAILY] (Oct. 24, 2014),
http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2014/1024/c70731-25904899.html.
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Creemers, supra note 28; Kellogg, supra note 28.
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Constitution.”195 Shrewd observers would probably note that the same speech also emphasized
the need for “Party leadership” 196—which might seem inconsistent with promoting the political
supremacy of a document that makes almost no mention of the Party—but when compared to the
previous status quo, the amount of rhetorical emphasis Xi placed on the Constitution and the “rule
of law” was nonetheless highly unusual. One month later, the 4th Plenum of the Party Congress
issued a major decision that not only, as discussed in Part II, promised sweeping changes to judicial
institutions, but also repeated Xi’s emphasis on ruling and governing “in accordance to the
Constitution.”197
Perhaps as a way of giving this rhetoric some social substance, the Plenum took the extra step of
creating a new public holiday: it designated December 4, the anniversary of the Constitution’s
enactment in 1982, as China’s “Constitution Day,” and made plans for a sweeping propaganda
campaign aimed at increasing societal awareness of and respect for the document. 198 Soon after,
the Ministry of Education directed all elementary, middle, and high schools to compile a
“constitutional education curriculum,” and—in an unusually strong signal of seriousness—
announced plans to include questions about the Constitution in all future high school admissions
examinations. 199
While all this was going on, the Party-controlled media took considerable pains to emphasize that
the model of the socialist constitution advocated by Xi and other Party leaders was fundamentally
different from “Western ‘Constitutionalism’” (xifang “xianzheng”). 200 Western systems, a
People’s Daily op-ed argued, placed too much emphasis on “the separation of powers, rotations
between political parties, and interest-group politics,” whereas the Chinese model stressed the
stable and unchallenged leadership of a politically advanced and publicly-minded Communist
Party. 201 The “basic spirit” of the Constitution was therefore not against one-party domination,
but instead focused on regulating politics and governance within the one-party framework. These
qualifications were later echoed by SPC Chief Justice Zhou Qiang in a well-publicized 2017
speech, in which he expressed mistrust towards Western institutions, and argued for a kind of
Chinese constitutional exceptionalism based on socialism and China’s “special political
circumstances.” 202
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Xi Jinping, Zai Qingzhu Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui Chengli Liushi Zhounian Dahui Shang de
Jianghua [Speech at the Conference to Celebrate the 60th Anniversary of the Establishment of the National
People’s Congress], RENMIN RIBAO [PEOPLE’S DAILY] (Sept. 5, 2014),
http://cpc.people.com.cn/n/2014/0906/c64093-25615123.html.
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Id.
197
Decision of the 4th Plenum of the CCP Central Committee, supra note 80.
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Id.
199
Jiaoyu Bu guanyu zai Guojia Xianfa Ri Shenru Kaizhan Xianfa Xuexi Xuanchuan Jiaoyu Huodong de Tongzhi
[Notification by the Ministry of Education on Conducting Constitutional Study, Propaganda, and Education
Activities on National Constitution Day], JIAO ZHENG FA [PUBLICATIONS OF THE STATE COUNCIL MINISTRIES OF
EDUCATION, POLITICS, AND LAW] 2014-12, available at
http://www.moe.gov.cn/srcsite/A02/s7049/201411/t20141121_178775.html.
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Ping, supra note 193; see also Albert H.Y. Chen, Review of Tong Zhiwei, The Reform and Renewal of China’s
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One might be skeptical as to whether “constitutionalism” thus defined is really “constitutionalism”
at all, but that is not our concern here. Our argument is simply that Xi Jinping-era political
discourse and rhetoric—including even the kind of cautionary note discussed in the previous
paragraph—has substantially boosted the Constitution’s social and political profile, placing greater
and more consistent emphasis on the document than ever before in PRC politics. Clearly, the
Constitution can acquire sociopolitical salience despite the absence of “real” constitutionalism,
however defined, and despite the official condemnation of “Western constitutionalism.”
Compared with previous eras, when “Party leadership” was emphasized at least as strongly but
serious public discussion of constitutionalism was often absent, 203 post-2012 political discourse
has provided a major dose of stimulus to those who have argued, normatively and positively, for
the political “activation” of the Constitution. 204 The simultaneous emphasis on the Party’s control
actually reinforces this interpretation: evidently, the Party now considered it something that needed
to be controlled ever more carefully and explicitly. 205
Naturally, critics continue to exist in large numbers: many would claim, for example, that the CCP
has yet to show any concrete interest, beyond rhetorical valorization, of giving the document real
political significance. 206 We believe, however, that the post-2012 rhetorical shift was more
substantive than such skepticism acknowledges, and that the 2018 constitutional amendments
decisively confirm this view. As the following sections argue, the amendments constitute both an
open acknowledgement by the Party leadership that the Constitution already is politically
significant, and a clear signal that they plan to make it even more so.

B.

Removing Term Limits

Speculation over a possible constitutional amendment began almost immediately after the CCP’s
19th Party Congress in October, 2017. The Congress established Xi Jinping as the Party’s “core,”
a political designation indicating supreme status and power that was previously denied to Hu Jintao,
and observers quickly turned their attention to how he would entrench his new status. 207 Since the
enactment of the 1982 Constitution, most Party Congresses have in fact led to constitutional
amendments a few years later, sometimes to valorize the achievements of previous leaders by
putting their core political doctrines, such as Mao Zedong Thought or Deng Xiaoping Theory, 208
into the Constitution, but more often to complement major changes in official economic or social
policy. The State Owned Enterprise reforms of the 1990s, for example, were accompanied by a
number of changes to the constitutional text that allowed for market-oriented management of state
203

Kellogg, supra note 28, at 339 (“[T]he first ten months of 2013 saw a level of conversation on constitutionalism
not seen in China in nearly a decade.”)
204
At the very least, the sociopolitical salience of the issue has clearly risen significantly. Creemers supra note 28;
Kellogg, supra note 28.
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Ping, supra note 193; Shi, supra note 193.
206
Kellogg, supra note 28, at 344-46.
207
Chris Buckley, Xi Jinping Is China’s ‘Core’ Leader: Here’s What It Means, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 30, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/31/world/asia/china-xi-jinping-communist-party.html.
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2004 CONSTITUTION, supra note 56.
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assets. 209 Given that Xi had already elevated his own somewhat ambiguously defined political
doctrine, “Xi Jinping Thought,” to the same status as Mao Zedong Thought in the Constitution of
the Chinese Communist Party, 210 most observers were expecting at least a similar change in the
national Constitution.
The real center of focus, however, was over presidential term limits. Prior to 2018, the Constitution
prohibited any President of the PRC to serve for more than two terms, for a total of ten years. 211
While this was only binding over the presidency, and not over the more powerful position of Party
Secretary, no Party Secretary had ever served for more than two regular terms after Mao’s death
in 1976. 212 The “two term rule” was therefore widely considered a “meta-norm” of Chinese
politics that both formally bound the country’s nominal leader, the President, and informally bound
its actual one, the Party Secretary. 213 In fact, since 1993, the two positions have always been held
by the same person. As early as 2016, speculation had begun to emerge that Xi might want to
abandon this norm and potentially rule for much longer. There were two layers to such speculation:
first, whether he would try to rule for longer than the customary two terms, and second, how he
might actually accomplish this. 214 The latter, in particular, included the legal issue of whether he
would remove the two-term limit from the Constitution, which would formally allow him to serve
as both Party Secretary and President for life.
The formal announcement of a constitutional amendment to remove Presidential term limits on
February 25, 2018 and its eventual enactment on March 11 came as a surprise to most China
watchers, 215 ourselves included. The most common prediction had been that Xi would likely
attempt to stay in power for more than two terms, but would do so by keeping the Party Secretary
209

Id.
An Baijie, Xi Jinping Thought Approved for Party Constitution, China Daily (Oct. 24, 2017),
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/19thcpcnationalcongress/2017-10/24/content_33644524.htm.
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2004 CONSTITUTION, supra note 56.
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ZHONGGUO GONGCHAN DANG DANZHANG [CONSTITUTION OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY], as amended on
Oct. 24 2017 by the 19th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, available at
http://www.12371.cn/special/zggcdzc/ [hereinafter 2017 CCP CONSTITUTION]. Jiang Zemin did serve an extra three
years in the position from 1989 to 1992, during which the emergency sacking of Zhao Ziyang after the Tiananmen
Incident made it necessary to parachute him in from Shanghai to serve as an emergency stopgap. During this time,
he was generally subordinate to Deng in the Party hierarchy during this period, and did not ascend to real leadership
until 1992, which marked the beginning of his first “true” term as Party Secretary. Mao, of course, was Party
Chairman until his death in 1976, after which the position was soon replaced by that of Party Secretary, which no
one, not even Deng, has ever held for more than 10 years.
213
Ben Blanchard & Sue-Lin Wong, China Sets Stage for Xi to Stay in Office Indefinitely, REUTERS (Feb. 25, 2018),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-politics/china-sets-stage-for-xi-to-stay-in-office-indefinitelyidUSKCN1G906W (“There is no limit on his tenure as the party and military chief, though a maximum 10-year term
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Chris Buckley, Xi Jinping May Delay Picking China’s Next Leader, Stoking Speculation, N.Y. Times (Oct. 4,
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/05/world/asia/china-president-xi-jinping-successor.html; Tom Mitchell,
Speculation Grows Xi Jinping Will Defy China Rule on Leadership Retirement, FINANCIAL TIMES (Oct. 11, 2016),
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CPC Proposes Change on Chinese President’s Term in Constitution, Feb. 25, 2018, XINHUA NET,
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position and the chairmanship of the Central Military Commission, while entrusting the presidency
to a trusted ally. The reason for this was a simple and straightforward cost-benefit calculation: of
the three positions that the “top leader” has generally held since 1993—Party Secretary, Military
Commission Chairman, and President—the President is by far the least important position, having
few regular political powers. 216 Its main constitutional role is, in theory, diplomacy and foreign
policy, but this has never been an exclusive authority, and the PRC has a long history of Party
Secretaries and Military Chairmen directly conducting diplomacy and controlling foreign policy
despite not holding the presidency. 217 In effect, Xi could have relinquished the presidency while
retaining nearly all his “real” authority. If, on the other hand, he moved to amend the Constitution,
it would be an ostentatious tactic that would provoke a tremendous amount of public discussion,
and therefore provide a potential focal point for political and social resistance. Xi was, in all
likelihood, more than powerful enough to deal with such resistance, but the cost would be high
and the returns moderate. A constitutional amendment would, in essence, be a luxury good, and
therefore probably not worth it.
Looking back, there are two possible explanations for Xi’s pursuit of the amendment—and for the
mistaken predictions made by scholars and analysts. The simpler and more obvious one is that we
had underestimated Xi’s power and, in the same vein, overestimated the strength of potential
societal or political opposition. In other words, he possessed so much power that he really could
afford to “waste” some of it on a luxury good, cost-benefit analyses notwithstanding. After all, the
most decisive way to set up potentially lifelong rule would be to eliminate, rather than circumvent,
institutional obstacles, regardless of their functional significance.
This explanation is likely attractive to most outsiders who lament the decline of factional checks
and balances in Chinese politics, and who see Xi’s rise as simply one man’s brutal and efficient
seizure of power. 218 It rests, however, on some fairly questionable factual assumptions: most
importantly, there is no evidence to suggest that the removal of constitutional term limits was, in
fact, painless or easy. Instead, there is reason to suspect that Xi had actually encountered
opposition that was only overcome with some difficulty. To understand why, one must have a
basic understanding of Chinese political timing: following a Party Congress, which are held in
October every five years, the Party leadership hosts a series of plenums to discuss and decide major
policy items. The first of these is held immediately after the Party Congress, the second almost
always at the beginning of the following calendar year, and the third almost always towards the
end of that year. 219 The Second Plenum of the 19th Party Congress, held in January 2018, focused
216

The President’s powers are almost purely ritualistic, and nearly any substantive decision he makes must be
approved by the NPC before taking effect. The major exception is foreign relations, where he has the power to
conduct diplomacy as head of state. See 2004 CONSTITUTION, supra note 56, at arts. 79-84.
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on constitutional amendment, and afterwards produced a public report that mentioned virtually
every other item on the eventual March amendment except the removal of term limits. 220 A week
later, the Central Committee voted on a formal proposal to amend the Constitution, but quite
unusually, did not immediately publish its contents. 221 Barely a month later, the Third Plenum
took place under a shroud of unusual secrecy and urgency, more than eight months before it would
normally be held. At the same time, state media finally published the full amendment proposal,
including the proposed removal of term limits. 222
Given the severe lack of transparency, there is only so much information that one can glean from
this chain of events, but it would seem to suggest that Xi was not comfortable enough with the
level of support he had received at the Second Plenum. Otherwise, it would be rather difficult to
explain why there was no announcement in January, or why the Third Plenum had to be rushed
through in this unprecedented fashion. As a result, outside speculation ran rampant that Xi had
called an emergency session of the Third Plenum to shore up support for the amendment. 223 While
one might be tempted to dismiss this as a mere conspiracy theory, the circumstances surrounding
the amendment’s proposal and passage were indeed irregular enough to justify some suspicion.
At the very least, it seems reasonable to suspect that the amendment’s passage was not entirely
smooth sailing for Xi and his allies—and if so, then it becomes much harder to argue that he was
so awash in political power that luxury goods were readily affordable.
The second and perhaps sounder explanation is, therefore, that the amendment was not a luxury
good at all. In other words, scholars and other observers have seriously underestimated the
political importance of the Constitution, and perhaps of law in general: if Xi were to stay on for a
third term without removing the two-term presidency rule, he would be—subjectively, at least—
taking on substantial political risks that outsiders fail to appreciate. The simplest and most
powerful of these could be that the office of the presidency might empower whoever occupies it
to challenge Xi’s authority, even if that person was initially a trusted ally. This kind of argument
would necessarily assume that, within the political imagination of the Party leadership, and
220
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39

Electroniccopy
copyavailable
available at:
at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3250948
Electronic
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3250948

specifically of Xi himself, the office holds much greater sociopolitical significance than outsiders
conventionally assign to it.
But where does this significance come from? As we argue in Part IV, there is very good reason to
believe that the Chinese public now attaches a much greater level of sociopolitical legitimacy to
law and legality than it did even as recently as 15 years ago, and that this “legalization” of social
sentiment is only accelerating. 224 As both the Party leadership’s post-2013 judicial reform
campaign and its ramping up of constitutional discourse suggest, it may very well be acutely aware
of these changes and has, in fact, already adjusted its political behavior to accommodate them. A
society that attaches increasing amounts of political legitimacy to law, however, is also likely to
be one in which a constitutionally sanctioned presidency is gaining sociopolitical stature relative
to the essentially extra-legal office of Party Secretary. In such an environment, the political risks
of “delegating” the presidency to an ally, however trusted he or she may be, are constantly growing,
independent of the specific governmental functions that the office performs. This suggests, among
other things, that that the Constitution’s political weight was considerably lower in the 1970s and
1980s than it is now: whereas both Mao and Deng were content to let a colleague be the
constitutional head-of-state while ruling securely from the perch of either Party Chairman or
Military Commission Chairman, 225 Xi can no longer afford this kind of “nominal power sharing”
precisely because the Presidency has become less nominal and more substantial.
None of this is to suggest that Xi and other Party leaders are somehow enlightened
constitutionalists who deeply and normatively care about the rule of law in any genuine sense.
Instead, the argument here is only that they seem to understand how important law and the
Constitution are as sources of sociopolitical legitimacy in contemporary China, and are therefore
eager to remove any incompatibility between personal political ambitions and the formal legal
structure of the state. In that sense, the constitutional amendment is still a power play, but it is a
power play made under the assumption that law in general and the Constitution in particular
matter—both politically and socially.
The major pro-legality and pro-Constitution propaganda campaign that accompanied the
amendment lends further support to this interpretation. The state and Party media went all out to
praise and defend the political wisdom and necessity of the amendment, but that was only one side
of a surprisingly broad and complex campaign. 226 Party officials and media commentators spent
224

See discussion at infra Part Four, Section B.
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Quanmian Yifa Zhiguo [Advancing “Comprehensively Governing the Country According to Law” by Implementing
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at least as much energy—probably more, in fact—in advocating general principles such as “ruling
the country according to law” and “ruling the country according to the Constitution” as they did
in defending the actual constitutional amendments. 227 In fact, many major pieces of political
commentary make no specific mention of the amendments at all, but are entirely devoted to the
former: for example, “successful governance is only possible if the country is ruled in strict
accordance to written laws, and the most important step towards this general objective is ruling it
in strict accordance to the Constitution.”228 These kinds of arguments, which flooded Chinese
media platforms from late February to early April, may very well have emerged primarily to
support the amendments, but they nonetheless reflect a political mentality in which the
amendments are only deemed publically acceptable if they are both preceded and reinforced by a
general commitment to legality.

C.

Legalizing the Party

Given its outsized political implications, the removal of term limits has accounted for the lion’s
share of media and academic attention on the 2018 constitutional amendments, but it is, in fact,
only one out of several changes. Some of these changes appear cosmetic, such as the enshrining
of “Xi Jinping Thought” and Hu Jintao’s “Scientific Outlook on Development” into the
Constitution,229 or the new requirement that all civil servants must swear an oath of allegiance to
the Constitution when entering office, 230 but others bring more fundamental changes to the Partystate. Changes in this latter category primarily focus on giving the CCP a stronger constitutional
foundation for leadership, and on formalizing some of its most important political functions. 231
As noted above, the Constitution had previously mentioned the CCP only in its preamble. 232 This
has always been a source of embarrassment for those who would otherwise like to argue that China
is morphing into a “constitutional state,” 233 but the 2018 amendments provided these people with
some measure of validation: the new version of the Constitution now states in its very first article
that “the socialist system is the basic system of the People’s Republic of China,” and that “the
defining feature of socialism with Chinese characteristics is the leadership of the Communist Party
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Commission).
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of China.” 234 This gives the CCP the clear constitutional status it previous lacked, and effectively
makes any move to a true multi-party political system unconstitutional.
More substantively, the amendments also provided for the creation of an entirely new
governmental entity, the Supervisory Commission, that exercised investigation powers parallel,
and sometimes superior, to other constitutionally recognized branches of government. 235 The
Commission would exercise supervision powers over all public employees, including government
officials, state owned enterprises, other government managed institutions, and public schools and
universities, and would investigate any “illegal or criminal conduct abusing public office.” 236 In
effect, this was a new anti-corruption agency: one that is directly enshrined in the Constitution as
a peer institution to the Judiciary and Procuracy, and is governed by formal procedural rules
concerning investigation, detention, and eventual prosecution. 237
Anti-corruption work has been Xi Jinping’s hallmark political achievement over the past 5 years.
From the minute he ascended to the Party’s top position, he has made “placing power within a
cage” a central—arguably the central—component of his political vision. 238 By this he likely
means the power of others in the Party-state and not his own, but the crackdown in government
corruption has nonetheless been serious and highly effective: A sweeping and lengthy campaign
that began in late 2012 has punished nearly 1.4 million members of the Party, including top level
officials, both civilian and military, previously considered to be untouchable. 239 As scholars have
noted, Xi’s first two years saw more high-ranking party members removed than had occurred in
the previous ten years combined. 240 Many quantitative measures of corruption—such as spending
on luxury goods—have plummeted as a result. 241
Prior to the creation of the Supervisory Commission, the campaign had been led by the CCP’s
Central Discipline Commission (CDC), which correspondingly became perhaps the single most
widely feared entity among public servants. 242 Although there were a number of state organs that
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engaged in some anti-corruption work, such as the Anti-Corruption Bureau of the Procuracy and
the State Council’s Ministry of Supervision, they were all clearly subordinate to the CDC, which
not only had a higher administrative rank, but also enjoyed a much broader set of investigatory
and punitive powers. 243 The Supervisory Commission, in contrast, is designed to be a peer
institution, possessing both equal administrative rank and an even broader jurisdiction than the
CDC: whereas the CDC’s jurisdiction is limited to Party members, the Commission can investigate
any public employee. 244 As part of a general restructuring campaign to merge and connect
functionally overlapping Party and state institutions, 245 the two entities now share both an office
building and a formal administrative partnership (heshu bangong). 246
The 2018 amendments were therefore a rather mixed blessing for the CDC: they gave it a
substantially more powerful and constitutionally sanctioned partner, but also seriously diluted its
hegemony over anti-corruption investigations. This likely reflects a new political consensus that
anti-corruption work requires a stronger legal foundation than the CDC alone was able to provide.
The Party leadership has long spoken of the need to “institutionalize” anti-corruption work (zhidu
fanfu), 247 but until the 2018 amendment, there were at least three different ways to interpret this
slogan: first, it could simply mean that anti-corruption investigations needed to become more
frequent and predictable; second, it could mean that investigative procedures needed become more
regularized and, in some ways, transparent; or, third, it could mean that legally sanctioned
government institutions needed to play a more prominent role, rather than having a Party organ
dominate the process. A direct expansion of the CDC’s personnel and administrative capacity, for
Lyric Chen, Who Enforces China’s Anti-corruption Laws? Recent Reforms of China’s Criminal Prosecution
Agencies and the Chinese Communist Party’s Quest for Control, 40 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 139 (2017).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/ilr/vol40/iss2/1.
243
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244
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Guowu Yuan Jigou Gaige Fang’an [Plan to Restructure the State Council], March 17, 2018, STATE COUNCIL
OFFICIAL WEBSITE, http://www.gov.cn/guowuyuan/2018-03/17/content_5275116.htm. In March, 2018, the Party
leadership initiated a broader campaign to merge functionally overlapping Party and state entities. Several
preexisting Party entities such as the Propaganda Department were merged with corresponding state institutions.
This round of restructuring—one of the largest in post-Mao history—had two major consequences: first, it gave the
Party a much larger role in the day-to-day governance of the country—in other words, it strengthened “the
leadership of the Party.” It facilitated an expansion of the Party’s administrative capacity by giving it some direct
control over state bureaucratic institutions. Second, the merging of Party and State institutions at the same time that
“governing according to law” was becoming arguably the ascendant political campaign in China also imposed a
much stronger dose of legality on the Party. Party operations, especially those that were conducted under the name
of an incorporated state institution or those that involved joint exercises with an independent state organ, would
presumably become more rule-oriented and bureaucratically formal. Some scholars believe that the merger would
actually allow citizens to sue Party entities under the Administrative Litigation Law, so long as they were issuing
decisions through the state institutions that they had merged with. See Interview with He Haibo, Professor of Law,
Tsinghua University, conducted by Taisu Zhang (Jun. 30, 2018) (on file with authors).
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example, would satisfy the first interpretation, but not the latter two; whereas such an expansion
coupled with stronger internal regulations that were then publicized would satisfy the first two, but
not the last. Instead of these options, the Party leadership chose a path that potentially satisfies all
three: the creation of the Supervisory Commission not only promises to make anti-corruption
investigations more frequent, predictable, and procedurally transparent, but also does that through
formal constitutional authorization. Whereas the CDC had been both the public face of Xi’s anticorruption campaign and its functional leader, it now shares those roles with the Supervisory
Commission.
Prior to the amendment, the CDC had actually been making substantial progress on the procedural
regularity and transparency front. 248 Over the past-five years, it has developed fairly sophisticated
quasi-legal procedures for investigations and internal punishment. The system was used to
develop evidence that is then used in some formal prosecutions. As early as 2013, the system had
established an internal set of regulations, regular procedures for opening cases and gathering
evidence, hearings, and appeals by disciplined officials. 249 But at the same time, its detention
system remained extra-legal, and those who have been subject to it describe harrowing
intimidation and torture. Under the system of “double-designated detention” (shuanggui), officials
under investigation were detained—disappeared, rather—for a period and at a place of the party’s
designation, with no formal legal protection. 250
Such opacity eventually generated enough outcry that, in 2017, Xi announced that the CDC would
no longer use shuanggui. 251 Even so, the extra-legal nature of the CDC continued to be a liability
in terms of social perception, prodding the Party leadership to eventually create a separate anticorruption institution that possessed both formal constitutional authorization and a legally
enshrined code of conduct. Looking back, these developments were arguably foreshadowed in a
2013 Xi Jinping speech that claimed: “[We] have to become good at using… the rule of law to
fight corruption, [and] to strengthen national anti-corruption legislation.” 252 This move towards
‘the rule of law” and legislation involved, first, the intra-Party formalization of relatively informal
investigatory procedures, followed by full-blown constitutional formalization. Clearly, the former
alone was deemed insufficient.
The CDC is less prominent after the amendment than it was before, but this actually leaves the
Party leadership in a stronger position: not only will the Commission, with its expanded
248
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bureaucratic capacity, strengthen the Party leadership’s control over other branches and levels of
government, but it also does so in an openly legal fashion that helps ward off the complaints of
procedural opacity and informality previously lodged against the CDC. A direct expansion of the
CDC may very well have provided the former, but no expansion of Party institutions alone could
have supplied the latter—instead, a constitutional amendment was deemed necessary.

D.

Interpreting the Amendments

The 2018 amendments put the Constitution front and center in two of the most important
developments in post-1978 Chinese politics: the institutionalization and legal formalization of anticorruption work, and the removal of leadership term limits. Placing the amendments within a
somewhat wider context of post-2012 developments, they appear to be the culmination of a multiyear process in which the Party leadership trumpeted the Constitution’s political importance. What
is clear from these developments is that the Party leadership, for reasons we will explore in Part
IV, now places enormous political emphasis on the Constitution: both the amendments themselves
and the rhetorical campaign that preceded them were probably made under the recognition that
valorizing and engaging the document would generate substantial political benefits, whereas
ignoring or circumventing it would be highly risky. To a large extent, these are the same rationales
that explain the judicial reforms discussed in Part II.
A related but more difficult question is whether the Party leaders are comfortable with the
Constitution’s rising political stature: whether they would prefer to reinforce or weaken it. The
argument for the former is fairly straightforward: the amendments have ostensibly, and probably
intentionally, elevated the document from something that, back in the 1970s and 1980s, could be
easily be ignored in high politics, 253 to something that is at least politically inconvenient to ignore.
Moreover, the amendment almost certainly increases the Constitution’s sociopolitical salience.
The enormous media campaign launched in conjunction with the amendment’s proposal and
passage has, in all likelihood, only cemented and reinforced the Party leadership’s rhetorical efforts
since 2012 to bolster constitutional awareness and prestige. 254 The newly constitutionalized
requirement of constitution oath-swearing also formalizes a recently introduced ritualistic and
performative element to the document, and gives it a stronger sense of political romanticism. If
the intent were to sabotage the document’s status, this would be an extremely curious and
counterproductive way to do that.
Skeptics might argue, however, that by expanding his personal power through constitutional
amendment, Xi Jinping has intentionally exposed the Constitution as fundamentally unstable and
overly political, and has therefore done substantial damage to its sociopolitical prestige and
status. 255 The problem with this interpretation is that it necessarily presupposes that there was
something approaching a consensus among either the general public or the political elite that the
253
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Constitution was immune—either normatively or in fact—from these kinds of politicallymotivated amendments in the first place. In other words, people had to have believed that there
was something constitutionally improper about the amendments. This is implausible: there was
nothing legally improper about the amendments, which were proposed and ratified in full
accordance with the preexisting text of the Constitution. If there is any argument to be made about
impropriety, it must rely on some unwritten “spirit of the Constitution” that prohibits this kind of
amendment. But this cannot be the case: the Constitution has nearly always and universally been
understood as a politically malleable document, both in fact and by design. 256 Critics of the
amendments may very well be disappointed by their content, but they are unlikely to believe that
they were somehow unconstitutional.
That said, such critics may very well hold the Constitution in lower regard now that its content is
less acceptable to them. In other words, what is being damaged is not some abstract sense of
political immunity or substantive constitutionality, but rather simple normative compatibility: if
one does not like the possibility of life-long rule, for example, one might consider an amendment
that facilitates it to be less just, and therefore less legitimate. Even if this is true, it tells us nothing
about the Party leadership’s intentions. If the goal was ultimately to set Xi up for potentially
lifelong rule, then it is hard to see how they could have done less damage to the Constitution’s
sociopolitical standing while still pursuing that goal: if he had simply stayed on as President
without amending the Constitution, that would be a formal breach of the document. If, on the
other hand, he had remained Party Secretary while giving up the Presidency, that would have made
the office—and, by extension, the Constitution—appear politically irrelevant, which is much
worse. Of the various options available, formal amendment would actually have done the least
damage to the Constitution’s stature, even sending a positive signal about its political importance.
Moreover, most Chinese citizens, while increasingly “legalistic,” are hardly liberal, and it is
unclear whether they disliked the amendments’ substantive content in the first place. 257

IV.

Explaining China’s Turn Towards Law

Parts II and III have argued that there has been a distinct and powerful move towards legality in
Chinese politics and governance since 2012: the judiciary and the Constitution have gained
political stature under Xi’s rule —dramatically so, in some dimensions—and their rapid ascension
both reflects and further facilitates a higher level of legality and rule-awareness in the operations
of the Party-state. The contrast between these developments and the so-called “turn against law”
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that seemed to dominate the previous regime is stark and powerful, but how should we understand
their emergence? This Part attempts to supply some plausible explanations.
Unsurprisingly, given its general lack of transparency, the Party leadership has been vague about
its reasons for promoting “governing the country according to law.” At the 19th Party Congress,
for example, Xi simply stated that “governing the country according to law is a fundamental
requirement and important safeguard of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics.” 258 The closest
he or any other Politburo Standing Committee member has ever come to supplying a detailed
rationale is in a 2014 speech that introduced the series of judicial reforms discussed above in Part
II, where Xi stated: “we [the Party leadership] share a consensus that … [ruling the country
according to law] … meets the demands created by both the Party’s and the country’s development,
and also meets the expectations expressed by all Party members and the People themselves.”259
Correspondingly, the Party leadership “made top-level structural designs for the construction of a
Socialist Rule-of-law Country,” by “focusing in a rigorous fashion to those stand-out issues that
the masses have expressed strong opinions on.” 260 Taking this literally, which of course should
always be done with great caution in China, means accepting that some amount of public demand
shaped the decision.
A widely circulated and reposted 2017 Party-issued “study guide” on Xi’s 19th Party Congress
speech provides some further insights into the official rationales: “only by governing the country
according to law,” the document states, “can we liberate and strengthen the productive energies of
society, promote social justice, maintain social harmony and stability, and sustain the long-term
peace and viability of both the Party and the country at large.” 261 By doing so, China can repel the
ideological offensive lodged by “hostile Western forces” and “some ill-intentioned [Chinese
citizens],” who use “the rule of law” as a “weapon” to “delegitimize the Party’s leadership and our
Socialist institutions.” 262
These texts identify two analytically distinct kinds of rationales: first, promoting the “rule of law”
provides functional benefits in political governance and socioeconomic management—“the
demands created by the Party’s and the country’s development” and the “liberation” of the
“productive energies of society”; second, it responds to institutional demands made by regular
Party members and “the People,” thereby preserving “social harmony.” Both, but especially the
latter, ultimately bolster the Party-state’s political and ideological legitimacy by, essentially,
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strengthening its popularity among the general population and repelling the attempts at ideological
persuasion made by its foreign and domestic adversaries.
The remainder of this Part adopts this basic categorization and differentiates between top-down
“instrumentalist” benefits of promoting legality and bottom-up “populist” benefits. The former,
discussed in Section A, focuses on the benefits the Party leadership reaps in terms of both political
control of other governmental entities and economic performance. The latter, discussed in Section
B, focuses on the Chinese population’s bottom-up demand for legality and how the political elite
are motivated to meet that demand.

A. Governance and Economic Benefits
This section summarizes the “supply side” instrumental benefits of legal ordering for the Partystate. We draw on and extend the literature here on courts in authoritarian regimes, which has, to
date, largely proceeded through a functionalist, principal-agent framework. 263 Scholars have
identified several functions that law and courts can play that may be attractive to authoritarian
regimes. These include, most prominently, providing credible commitments and lowering
transaction costs in the economic sphere; and solving principal-agent problems in administration—
both of which then strengthen the regime’s capacity for social control. 264
With the ascendance of the new institutional economics in the 1980s and 1990s, an enormous
amount of writing has been devoted to the economic benefits of legality, especially under
conditions of commercialization and high demographic mobility: stronger enforcement of
contracts, more predictable economic behavior by both governmental and private actors, easier
conveyance of regulatory and institutional information—all of which lead to lower transaction
costs and information costs in everyday economic activity, and therefore to more efficient
allocation and use of resources. 265 In the Chinese context, many scholars have argued that legal
reform has been a major driving force behind the unprecedented economic growth China has
experienced over the past four decades, and, regardless of whether they are indeed correct, it is
abundantly clear that the current Party leadership shares their view. 266 Moreover, effective and
263
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professional law enforcement can increase the willingness of private actors to pursue judicial
solutions to local disputes, which then supplies the government with more information—and
therefore more control—over private social, economic, and political behavior.
Law is also commonly seen as an important, perhaps indispensable tool in administrative
management, especially in large and demographically diverse societies like China. For rulers at
the top, imposing legality upon governmental behavior is one of the most effective ways to ensure
that their commands will be faithfully carried out in local administration. 267 In a country the size
of China, with its vast number of local governmental units, it is arguably the only effective way. 268
Not only does legality help the central government clearly convey its expectations and demands
to both local governmental and private actors, but it also encourages the general population to
report—through mechanisms such as administrative litigation—illegal or extra-legal
governmental behavior to the center, thereby enhancing the center’s information collection
capacity vis-à-vis its local agents. This, in turn, enhances the center’s capacity to enforce its own
rules—as opposed to rules created by local agents—against local private actors.
Now, an authoritarian state is not necessarily a centralized one, and if the central government
favors some version of “de facto federalism,” then it would have less need and incentive to tackle
principal-agent control problems through legalization. But whereas previous PRC regimes in the
1980s and 1990s were happy to allow a measure of political decentralization, 269 Xi has shown the
opposite political instinct. 270 This reemphasis on central control would, in theory, simultaneously
enhance his appetite for legality.
One might think that these features would make legality universally attractive in authoritarian
regimes that emphasize top-down control—and they do indeed feature prominently within the
Chinese Party-state—but there are some complicating characteristics of its traditionally Leninist
political structure that, in theory, would hamper the pursuit of legality. We provide, therefore, a
somewhat thicker account here, drawing loosely on work in political sociology that focuses on
state-society relations. 271 All states strive for social control, but their ability to achieve it depends
on relations with social forces with different goals and aims. In the conventional theories of
Development, in CHINA’S GREAT ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION 375 (Loren Brandt & Thomas G. Rawski eds.,
2008); Donald C. Clarke, Economic Development and the Rights Hypothesis: The China Problem, 51 AM. J. COMP.
L. 89 (2003) (revising some part of law and economic development hypothesis but reinforcing others). For
counterarguments, see, for example, Franklin Allen, Jun Qian & Meijun Qian, Law, Finance, and Economic Growth
in China, 77 J. FIN. ECON. 57 (2005) (arguing that China is a counterexample to the conventional wisdom on law
and development); Susan Feng Lu & Yang Yao, The Effectiveness of Law, Financial Development, and Economic
Growth in an Economy of Financial Repression: Evidence from China, 37 WORLD DEV. 763 (2009) (arguing that
there is no evidence that legal institution building had a positive effective on Chinese GDP growth). The Party
leadership’s view is nicely summarized in 19th Party Congress Speech, supra note 251, which expresses a strong
belief in the positive relation between legality and economic development.
267
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authoritarian legality discussed above, courts are a crucially important site of state-society
interaction, simultaneously providing a mechanism of social control while also disciplining the
state itself. 272
A Leninist account of state-society and law-society relations is substantially more complex, in that
it separates what would otherwise be a unified state structure into “Party” and “state.” In Marxist
theory, both the legal system and the broader state apparatus are part of the “superstructure” that
is supposed to “wither away” as society is gradually perfected. 273 Society will eventually become
a self-organizing system in which the state is unnecessary. Until that time, Leninism advocates a
theory of political leadership, in which a vanguard Party supervises and penetrates a less politically
advanced but more administratively expansive “state.” 274 The Party controls political doctrine—
and the political indoctrination of society—while the state directly manages socioeconomic life
until such a time that society becomes politically advanced enough to manage itself.
The Party leadership faces two central challenges, or agency problems, in this effort. The first is
to ensure that the Party itself acts in a coordinated fashion, a kind of internal coordination problem
to ensure collective unity. The second is to keep the functionally differentiated sub-parts of the
state from becoming alternative power centers. The Party leadership’s traditional and preferred
solution to its internal agency problem is ideological homogeneity: by ensuring that individual
members internalize the “Party line”, the Party resolves its internal tensions to act in a unified
fashion. But relations with the “state” are innately more complex. How does the Party effectively
control a less ideologically and politically homogenous state apparatus?
The solution has often been to invest in some degree of legality: if the ideological “purity” of the
state apparatus cannot be guaranteed, then it must be controlled through institutional oversight and
rule-based conduct, both of which, as discussed above, benefit from political investment in
legality. 275 The most interesting thing about this line of thought is that it sees legality as,
effectively, a “second-best” functional substitute for ideological homogeneity: ideally, society
becomes ideologically advanced enough so that legality—and the state itself—is no longer needed,
but when ideological homogeneity cannot yet be obtained, then legality must step in as a
substitute. 276
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But this begs a further question: what happens if the ideological homogeneity of the Party itself
begins to recede, but the Party-state system continues to exist? Under such circumstances, must
the Party then apply the “second-best” strategy of legality to itself?
The history of modern Chinese politics since 1979 is, to a very large extent, a story of how legality
has supplanted ideologiy as the Party leadership’s primary means of control. Somewhat
surprisingly, Party-state relations have not been much analyzed in the study of post-Mao
politics. 277 One recent exception is Dingping Guo, who, quoting Hannah Arendt on Nazi Germany,
notes that “'even an expert would be driven mad if he tried to unravel the relationships between
Party and State.” 278 Guo offers a fourfold typology of Party-state relations in different regimes, in
which both Party and state can be either weak or strong. 279 In a strong state-weak party regimes,
typical of democracies, parties struggle to obtain power, and may find themselves confronted by
administrative resistance once they obtain it. 280 The very certainty of rotation in power that
characterizes democracies means that there is the possibility of bureaucratic resistance to political
control. The differentiation of the state that characterizes a separation of powers regime further
entrenches this as a matter of constitutional design. In a strong Party-weak state regime, by
contrast, an all-powerful Party seizes control of the state, for example in Nazi Germany and
Stalinist Russia. Weak Party-weak state regimes are exemplified by personalist dictatorships, in
which a charismatic leader overrides both Party and state. 281 This, Guo points out, reflects the
situation of China under Mao after he launched the Cultural Revolution against elites in both party
and state. The Party’s central organs ceased to function even as the state structure atrophied, and,
in the end, the ideological unity of the Party itself began to fall apart. 282
Guo’s framework is useful for understanding the current moment. Party-state relations have
changed dramatically since the end of the Cultural Revolution, as Deng Xiaoping and his
colleagues sought to provide a more stable and orderly basis for Chinese governance. 283 Among
their innovations were the idea of collective leadership and the regular rotation of top personnel.
By providing for orderly leadership succession within the Party, the approach allowed for greater
institutionalization and capacity, for example through the CDC with its semi-legalistic procedures
and processes. 284 These moves marked a shift away from ideological mechanisms of internalized
social control, largely discredited after the Mao era, towards more formally hierarchical and semilegalistic mechanisms within the Party. When traditional ideological solutions to the first agency
problem, that of intra-Party coordination, faltered, institutionalization and semi-legality stepped in
to share the burden. The result was a Party apparatus that became stronger than the one inherited
at Mao’s death.
277
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Having shored up the Party’s institutional coherence, the Deng regime then orchestrated the return
of the state and its differentiation from the Party. Relative to the Mao era, the Party not only
became stronger but also withdrew from society. This configuration was distinct from the “weak
Party, strong state” paradigm characteristic of democracies, but had some features in common
because of the emphasis on the state’s structural development. 285 Nearly all references to the
Communist Party were dropped from the 1982 Constitution, even as the development of legal
infrastructure, under the banner of “socialist rule of law”, emphasized formal state institutions
rather than more informal Party tools for controlling society. 286 This effort restructured and
strengthened the legal system, and provided the institutional basis for 30 years of rapid and largely
stable economic growth. 287
From this perspective, China is now moving towards a strong Party-strong state regime, in which
both state capacity and Party control are strengthened through investment in legality. Relative to
the early years of the Deng era, the Party has struck back under Xi, with a new rhetorical emphasis
on its political control and penetration of society. 288 But if the Party leadership is to maintain
effective control over its newly empowered cadres, it needs a better set of tools to coordinate Party
activity. As much as Xi might want to accomplish this through ideological indoctrination alone,
the current ideological diversity both within the Party and across society in general—an
unavoidable consequence of several decades of “opening up”—makes that unrealistic. 289 For at
least the short to medium term, the Party leadership must instead rely on legal reform and legality:
to facilitate routinized and relatively transparent control of society on the one hand, and to instill
discipline on wayward agents within both the Party and the state on the other.
The primary difference between the present situation and the Deng era is, therefore, a greater need
to manage a politically resurgent but no longer ideologically homogenous Party apparatus:
whereas Deng-era legal reforms could largely afford to ignore the Party due to its retreat from
direct socioeconomic management, Xi era reforms must cope with the opposite situation. As a
result, they seek to legalize and institutionalize Party activity just as much as they seek to formalize
the operation of state institutions. 290 The resulting institutional arrangements, such as the
collaboration between the Supervisory Commission and the CDC, facilitate the joint penetration
of both Party and state into society in a controlled and regularized fashion.
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The technological innovations of the social credit system are helpful here as well. 291 Besides its
obvious utility as a tool of social control, that system solves two aspects of the agency problem for
the center. First, by allowing the public to provide information on the performance of state
agencies, it improves the ability of the Party to monitor the state (while incidentally enhancing the
legitimacy of both in the eyes of the society). Second, by improving general incentives to comply
with judgements, it reinforces the power of legal tools to discipline personnel and to incentivize
performance. The suite of tools in China’s new techno-legal authoritarian system are a significant
innovation in the history of authoritarian legality, and collectively allow the Party leadership to
accomplish the tasks identified in the authoritarian legality literature—social control, credible
economic commitment, control of agents—more effectively, while preserving, and even
reinforcing, the Leninist Party-state model. It gives the regime the power to allocate and reallocate
powers and tasks to Party and state, with the knowledge that both will be able to operate in
predictable fashion vis-à-vis and increasingly complex society.
One could argue, in fact, that Xi’s pursuit of potential lifelong rule further intensifies the Party
leadership’s need for legality. As noted above, one of the major accomplishments of the Deng era
was to establish collective leadership and the regular rotation of top personnel. This helped
regularize and institutionalize political succession, providing much needed stability and order.
Xi’s dismantling of these institutions introduces a strong element of instability into succession
politics and damages the Party’s long term political cohesion. 292 This puts even greater pressure
on the Party leadership to maintain tight control over both Party and state entities, and therefore
enhances its incentive to invest in legal reform and law-based governance.
All in all, there are fairly powerful incentives for authoritarian regimes to invest in legality, which
can generate well-documented benefits in terms of economic development and sociopolitical
control. China’s Leninist political structure introduces some complications into this general
calculus, but current circumstances—in which Xi is attempting to construct a “strong Party-strong
state” paradigm under conditions of significant ideological diversity—nonetheless give the Party
leadership strong “supply side” reasons to emphasize legality in both Party and state operations.
This leaves open, however, the question of how a move towards legality will be received by the
general public: nothing in the above discussion touches upon “demand side” considerations created
by social attitudes towards law and legality, but such considerations are indisputably a central part
of the Party leadership’s political calculus. They are the subject of the following section.

B. Ideological Winds and Social Perceptions of Legitimacy
The instrumental rationales discussed in Section A go a long way towards explaining the recent
turn towards legality in Chinese politics, but they work better with some parts of the picture than
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others: the empowerment of courts, for example, has a straightforward connection with the Party
leadership’s interest in sociopolitical control and economic development, but the Constitutional
amendments do not. The removal of presidential terms limits through constitutional amendment
simply bears no connection to either top-down control or economic development, and, as suggested
above, may in fact run counter to both. If the explanation is simply that Xi desires more personal
power, that merely begs the question of why he pursued it through formal constitutional means,
when, as argued above, there were extra-legal paths of lesser resistance available. None of the
instrumental rationales provide a compelling answer. Similarly, the creation of the Supervisory
Commission, again through constitutional amendment, is—when compared to a simple expansion
of the CDC’s administrative capacity—less about advancing central control per se than about
doing so in a formally constitutional manner. The Party leadership does not necessarily gain more
top-down control through constitutional amendment than through lesser legal or regulatory means.
Why, then, choose the most formal and publically visible route?
Furthermore, these top-down instrumentalist explanations are innately incomplete: they argue, in
essence, that if the Party leadership cared about things like economic development and top-down
control over local Party and state agents, then it would have strong incentives to invest in legality.
But why does it care about those things in the first place? Take, for example, the enormous
resources the Party leadership has sunk into judicial professionalization: on the one hand,
professionalized adjudication generates enormous benefits for economic development, but, on the
other, Party leaders belong to the elite segment of society that benefits most from judicial
corruption and bias. They have often been accused, especially during the Hu Jintao era, of
facilitating crony capitalism for personal economic gain, 293 which, if true, would lessen their
incentive to bolster judicial professionalism. Given these competing incentives, what swung their
calculations in favor of investing in legality?
One could raise a similar objection about central control over provincial and local authorities: just
how badly does the Party leadership really want it, and why? Although some might argue that
central authorities naturally desire more control over lower-level agents, decentralization is not
without its socioeconomic benefits: for example, scholars have long credited decentralized
governance and “de-facto federalism” for spurring Chinese economic growth in the 1980s and
1990s. 294 This has, as noted above, recently changed, but one nonetheless has to wonder if there
is a deeper layer of Chinese politics that we overlook by focusing on mid-level incentives like
“strengthening top-down control” or “boosting economic development.” Are there possible
rationales for the shift towards legality that draw from other, perhaps more fundamental, political
interests?
This Section discusses one such possibility: the shift is a straightforward response to rapidly
increasing demand for legality—for law-based and legally accountable governance, for lower
levels of corruption, and for more reliable enforcement of private legal rights—among the general
293
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population. In other words, legality has become a much more significant source of popular
legitimacy, and the Party leadership has responded by tapping into it more aggressively. This
explanation would fill in all the analytical gaps identified in the previous paragraphs: the
acquisition of public support and popular legitimacy, inextricably tied to long-term political
survival as it tends to be in modern societies, is surely a fundamental interest, arguably the
fundamental interest, of the Party leadership. Higher social demand for legality would reward
political investments in judicial professionalism and independence with higher levels of popular
support and perceived legitimacy. It would also put greater pressure on the Party leadership to
“legalize” the Party’s political dominance in publically visible ways, which supplies a strong
rationale for both the 2018 constitutional amendment and the multi-year media campaign that
preceded it.
This bottom-up account also gives a cleaner and more plausible explanation of timing and the
policy reversal from Hu to Xi—in which a “turn against law” was replaced with a powerful “turn
towards law”—than do the top-down theories discussed in the previous section. Whereas the
instrumental incentives discussed above tend to be long-term considerations that do not easily
explain short-term swings, elite political awareness of societal ideological developments is a
fickler thing that easily differs from regime to regime and from politician to politician. There are
indeed, as discussed below, signs that the Party leadership underwent such a transformation in
awareness from Hu to Xi.
A growing body of academic literature argues that Chinese social demand for legality has sharply
increased in recent years, to the point where it now exerts major influence over government
popularity and support. 295 As a number of sociological studies have shown, rights and legal
consciousness among the general population has grown dramatically over the past 30 years, and
was already a major driver of socioeconomic behavior by the early 2000s. 296 One particularly
interesting finding of these studies was that the rise in legal consciousness was largely unrelated
to the law’s material effectiveness: whereas positive litigation experiences generally encouraged
further engagement with the court system, negative experiences were actually more likely to spur
pro-legal reform activism than to discourage future litigation. 297 In other words, encountering
problematic legal institutions made people want to reform them, rather than ignore them, which
suggests that the legal consciousness they exhibited was deeply normative, rather than merely
instrumental, in nature. This echoes the findings of a 2018 study on “why the Chinese obey the
law,” which argues that, not only is the Chinese population now a law-abiding one, but their
reasons for doing so are predominantly moral or legitimacy-based, with procedural justice playing
a surprisingly large role. 298
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Other studies have shown that, by around 2008, most of the Chinese public had come to identify
legality as a central component of political legitimacy. In the 2008 Asia Barometer Survey, for
example, 55 percent of Chinese respondents disagreed that the government could “disregard the
law for policy considerations”—a higher percentage than in most other surveyed countries,
including Singapore, and an increase of some 15 to 20 percent from the early 2000s. 299 A recent
social experiment conducted by Susan Whiting further strengthens this connection between law
and political legitimacy: her study finds that state investment in legal services significantly
enhanced the popularity and perceived legitimacy of county governments, especially when paired
with media campaigns that boosted popular awareness of legal institutions. 300 As one scholar puts
it, Chinese people now tend to “demand that the state follow the law.” 301
The Party leadership began to publically acknowledge these sociopolitical trends by the end of the
Hu Jintao era. Although one could characterize law enforcement under Hu as perhaps moving
away from legality, by 2012, Hu himself openly acknowledged that a new strategy was necessary
if the Party was to maintain its political viability. In the lead-up to the 18th Party Congress, Hu
spoke of the need to “devote more attention…to the important uses of rule of law in national
governance and social management.” 302 By the Party Congress, he had ramped up this rhetoric to
something that bordered on alarmism: if the Party could not curb corruption and ensure that
officials followed the law, that “could prove fatal to the Party and even cause the collapse of the
Party and the fall of the state.” 303 In the same speech, he listed “the rule of law” as one of the
fundamental demands of “the People,” and argued that “the Party and the state must operate strictly
according to the law.” 304 For a leader who had spent much of the past decade deemphasizing
professionalized adjudication, this amounted to a startling admission of failure. Given that
outgoing leaders usually attempt the exact opposite, it likely took enormous sociopolitical pressure
for Hu to openly advocate a sharp departure from one of the core institutional characteristics of his
regime. One can only hypothesize over the nature of such pressure, but widespread social
unhappiness over ineffective law enforcement and governmental corruption, or at least the political
perception of such unhappiness, was very likely a major source.
The irony in all of this is that the purported “turn against law” was also ostensibly designed to be
a populist measure, something that was supposed to bolster the Party-state’s reputation through
promoting private reconciliation and “social harmony.” 305 Instead, citizens seemed to interpret
politically or socially motivated behavior by courts as a sign of judicial corruption, rather than as
a sign of judicial responsiveness, and seemed to favor giving courts higher levels of financial and
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institutional independence. 306 Seen from this perspective, the “turn against law” under Hu is best
understood as a simple miscalculation of social sentiment: the Party leadership made a judgment
call that it could win popularity through deemphasizing legality, and by 2012, had acknowledged
that this was a mistake. In their defense, much of the currently available evidence on pro-legality
social sentiment only emerged around or after 2008, after the “turn against law” had already begun.
Prior to that, a sizeable share of Chinese political and intellectual elites seemed to believe that the
Chinese population was “non-litigious” and distrusted legal institutions.307
Xi Jinping was, of course, all too happy to take Hu’s 2012 concession and run with it, swiftly
making legal reform and “the rule of law” cornerstones of his new political agenda. Not only did
this allow him to distinguish himself from the relatively unpopular preceding regime—which had
been embroiled in reports of corruption and infighting during its last few years—but it also allowed
him to tap into a major source of populist support and legitimacy. Xi spent much of his first 5 years
in power challenging the political status quo and breaking major norms that had stood since the
Deng era, such as prosecuting previous members of the Politburo Standing Committee and later
setting himself up for lifelong rule. 308 He therefore needed, much more so than his predecessors,
sources of political capital and support outside of the traditional political establishment. In other
words, Xi badly needed popular support. Nearly all observers agree that his anti-corruption
campaign has done just that—and if the explosion in litigation over the past 5 years is any
indication, so has the campaign to boost judicial professionalism and independence. 309 By all
observable signs, Xi is highly popular among the general population, 310 and the general push
towards legality documented above is one of the most important achievements, arguably the most
important achievement, of his first term. These two things are almost certainly interconnected.311
At least on the issue of legality, Xi has consistently shown far superior political instincts and
judgment than his predecessor.
There is unfortunately no room in this article to systemically explain how the Chinese population
came to adopt this highly legalistic attitude towards political legitimacy, but we can at least flag
some of the more promising candidates—none of which necessarily exclude the others. The first
possibility is that the population values legality for the same kinds of instrumental reasons that we
306
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identified in Section One: they believe that it enhances the predictability and reliability of
governmental action, and perhaps that it is critical for economic growth and personal enrichment.
Chinese citizens have long displayed a deep-rooted fear of governmental abuse of power. 312 More
recently, they have also consistently shown higher trust in central level officials than in local ones,
and tend to believe that local divergence from central directives is source of corruption, rather than
innovation and prudence. 313 Given these general attitudes, it would only be natural if they favored
the “rule of law” over “the rule of man”—to use two concepts that have long occupied a central
position in Chinese sociopolitical discourse 314—and therefore considered judicial professionalism,
independence, and a general commitment to legality as necessary conditions of good governance.
The vast wave of domestic migration and corresponding disintegration of local communities that
has swept over China in the past 40 years adds another dimension to these social demands. Until
the end of the Cultural Revolution, stable local communities, both urban and rural, were able to
supply many basic social goods such as financing, dispute resolution, childcare, employment, and
local norm enforcement. With the uprooting of some 40 percent of the population from the
countryside since 1978, many of these communities are no longer able to perform these functions,
forcing large portions of the population to rely instead on governmental or commercial
institutions. 315 As scholars have long argued, social disintegration tends to create greater bottomup demand for reliable and institutionalized state behavior—which feeds naturally into greater
demand for legality316—and the contemporary Chinese case is likely no exception.
Parallel and perhaps related to these socioeconomic developments, Chinese intellectuals have long
bought into the conventional wisdom that an independent and professional court system is
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necessary for modern economic development, 317 and it would be unsurprising if much of the
general population shared their conviction. In the 1990s, Chinese intellectuals and political elites
were some of the most avid consumers of the post-Cold War Western “liberal consensus,”
including the belief that secure economic rights, reliable contract enforcement, and the rule of law
in general is a prerequisite for growth. 318 At the forefront of this tendency were activist lawyers
of the weiquan movement, who sought to hold the state accountable for its formal legal
promises. 319 While the enthusiasm for American-style democracy and constitutionalism has
waned somewhat in recent years, the general belief that sustainable economic development
requires a high level of legality, including legal checks on governmental power, remains fairly
robust. 320 It seems quite likely, therefore, that a significant slice of the Chinese population—
especially its most intellectually active, economically affluent slice—believes deeply in the
economic benefits of legality. As the college-educated Chinese middle class has rapidly expanded
over the past two decades, 321 such beliefs have penetrated more deeply into society.
A second possibility is that the general population has simply accepted and internalized the prolegality rhetoric propagated by the government since at least the early 1980s—and arguably earlier.
As multiple scholars have argued, the CCP has long devoted substantial resources to the legal
education of the general public: the enactment of both the 1950 Marriage Law and the 1954
Constitution were followed by nation-wide campaigns to disseminate legal knowledge. 322 Even
at this early stage, many Party leaders believed that “the rule of law,” as opposed to “the rule of
man,” was a critical component of any sustainable sociopolitical order. Such beliefs receded
during the political turbulence of the late 1960s and 1970s, but, as noted above, made a large-scale
comeback under Deng. The late 1970s were widely perceived to be a moment of deep crisis by
the Party leadership, in which the very survival of the Party-state was at question. The diagnosis
they arrived at highlighted weak institutionalization and the arbitrary “rule of man” as one of the
fundamental problems of the Mao era, and as a fundamental threat to the Party’s legitimacy. 323 In
317
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response, the Party leadership committed itself to strengthening legal institutions, and to educating
the general population of the need for law-based governance. What followed was a three decadelong process in which the “rule of law,” often paired with anti-corruption campaigns in the 1980s
and 1990s, almost always occupied a central position in the Party’s sociopolitical rhetoric as one
of the primary objectives of reform. 324 Not even the Hu Jintao regime, despite its relative deemphasis of legality, substantively disavowed “the rule of law” as a normatively desirable
sociopolitical end—quite the opposite, it regularly reaffirmed the Party’s rhetorical commitment
to it, suggesting that Minzner’s characterization is overdrawn. 325
This kind of sustained rhetorical reinforcement—despite generating deep skepticism among
scholars—may very well have made a lasting and profound impression on the general public. In
recent years, some scholars have suggested that, over time, the Chinese public has responded
positively to this “rule of law” rhetoric, and that this created a positive feedback loop in which the
government could reap further legitimacy benefits from social conditions created by its own prior
rhetoric. 326 Although much of the general population treats certain kinds of government rhetoric,
such as those related to censorship or loyalty to the Party, with regular scorn and mockery, by all
indications this particular strand of propaganda has generated widespread enthusiasm. 327 At the
very least, the government’s rhetorical campaign has reinforced, if not quite created from scratch,
a highly favorable social disposition towards legality.
This brings up the question of whether there was any prior social sentiment to be reinforced, which
would constitute a third possible explanation—that is, “long-term social tradition,” rather than
“post-1949 political creation.” Although some scholars have characterized late imperial China as
a “lawless” society, 328 a characterization that generations of historians have vigorously resisted, 329
even the most ardent legal orientalist would have to agree that, by at least the late 19th Century,
there was enormous social and political demand for the legalization of both governmental activity
and socioeconomic relations. 330 Following a series of geopolitical and domestic catastrophes in
the 1840s and 1850s, central and local elites swiftly coalesced around a basic consensus that China
needed to “modernize,” and to do so, it needed to import both Western law and Western legal
culture. The underlying reasons for this were often functionalist: Chinese elites bought into a sort
of progressive mindset that saw legalization as a core component of “modernization,” which would
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then bring about rapid economic growth, sociopolitical stability, and geopolitical stature. 331
Consequently, an enormous wave of lawmaking and state-building materialized in the late 19th and
early 20th Centuries, transforming Chinese legal institutions into an amalgam of German, Japanese,
and British institutions.332 Ironically, this eventually created a political culture in which Western
law and Western legal culture came to possess something approaching deontological legitimacy:
independent of any truly functionalist considerations, it simply represented “modernity” and
“progress.” 333 By the 1930s, as more and more Chinese lawmakers and judges began to receive
training in Western Europe and the United States, the move towards legalization in the Western
image became unstoppable. 334
After the creation of the PRC, the Communist Party, as noted above, continued to pursue a
sociopolitical program of law-oriented state building and legal education. The dominant source of
foreign legal transplants became the Soviet Union, but the Party continued to valorize “the rule of
law” until the Anti-Rightist campaign of 1957, and picked up right where it left off after 1978. 335
In other words, apart from the Cultural Revolution year, the history of Chinese politics in the 20th
Century is essentially a history of elite-driven legalization. This may well have created a prolegality social consensus well before 1949, and even if it did not, there was at least a fairly clear
consensus among the educated elite that carried directly into the legal education programs in the
early PRC. Thus, the origins of today’s highly legalistic social culture reach back at least to the
early 20th Century, and perhaps much earlier—after all, as many historians have argued, late
imperial China was a heavily rules-oriented society in which legal institutions of various kinds
carried substantial socioeconomic weight.
None of these explanations necessarily exclude the others. Much more likely, they worked
together to generate today’s sociopolitical environment, in which the Party leadership gains
popularity and social legitimacy through legalizing politics and governance. From this perspective,
the Hu Jintao era was more of a temporary counter-movement in a long-term shift towards
legality—not quite a “long march towards the rule of law,” as Randall Peerenboom once argued, 336
but nonetheless a decades-long process in which written legal rules gained significance at all levels
of politics. This kind of shift can, in theory, be self-reinforcing: it incentivizes government
investment in institutionalization and legality, which then reinforces the social consensus in favor
of legality, which further incentivizes governmental legality. While it is perfectly possible that
some leaders will temporarily misjudge social sentiment, they will nonetheless tend to move, out
of simple self-interest, in a pro-legality direction over the long run. This seems to be a rather
accurate description of the modern history of Chinese legal development.

331

Id.
Id.
333
Id.
334
Id.
335
Id. See generally Albert H.Y. Chen, Legal Thought and Legal Development in the People’s Republic of China
1949-2008”, in John Gillespie and Albert H.Y. Chen (eds), LEGAL REFORMS IN CHINA AND VIETNAM: A
COMPARISON OF ASIAN COMMUNIST REGIMES 51, 53 (2010).
336
PEERENBOOM, supra note 5, at 1.
332

61

Electroniccopy
copyavailable
available at:
at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3250948
Electronic
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3250948

Conclusion: Implications for Authoritarian Governance
Our analysis holds major implications for understanding China’s current political and institutional
direction. Many China-watchers have decried Xi’s concentration of power, formalized in the
recent constitutional reforms, as a return to personalistic and anti-institutionalist rule in the style
of Mao. We disagree. To analogize Xi to Mao in this regard is to ignore the tremendous
institutional development that has occurred over the last three decades, and especially over the past
five years. Xi has presided over the strengthening of an increasingly routinized, resilient, and
independent set of judicial institutions that are both able to render complex legal rules legible to
society and, increasingly, capable of managing administrative compliance problems within the
governing apparatus. At the same time, he has politically activated the Constitution to provide a
firmer legal basis for the Party’s rule, while also using it to create new institutions for intragovernment oversight. As a result, the Party-state has actually strengthened its capacity to
accomplish core governance tasks of controlling local agents, settling disputes, and producing
social order. Both Party and state are stronger and more institutionalized. The risks of Xi’s
consolidated power—while still substantial—are therefore substantially less than what they were
in the Mao era: If, hypothetically, Xi were to disappear tomorrow, the institutions he has built and
reinforced would nonetheless remain in place, and China would retain much more of its
governance capacity than it could plausibly have managed had something similar happened in the
Mao years.
What this implies at a more theoretical level is that the personal consolidation of power in
authoritarian states is not necessarily incompatible with the strengthening of legal institutions.
Quite the opposite, an ascendant authoritarian ruler who seeks to gain power at the expense of his
former peers faces enormous challenges of political stability, which can create very strong
incentives to invest in legal reform as a monitoring and control mechanism. The larger the country,
the greater the difficulty of maintaining control, and therefore the greater the incentive for judicial
empowerment. Perhaps even more importantly, such a ruler is often in dire need of populist
legitimacy—his dismantling of the political status quo often dilutes his ability to draw support
from within the establishment—and, depending on sociocultural perceptions of law and legality,
legal reform can be a particularly potent way to acquire it.
This kind of legal reform—driven, as it is, by a desire to establish personal political dominance—
is unlikely to trend towards political liberalism, nor is it likely to overtly constrain the ruler in a
true “rule of law” sense. In the Chinese case, what it has produced is simply “legalism”: stronger
compliance with written legal rules, even as the rules, on their own terms, fail to constrain the
Party leadership in any substantial way. There has been no accompanying turn towards liberalism:
Western values are increasingly dismissed as decadent or simply incompatible, and topics like
press freedom, judicial independence and constitutionalism are included in lists of forbidden topics
for discussion. 337 Relatedly, the intimidation and arrest of weiquan (“rights protecting”) lawyers
and has had a major chilling effect on rights-activism, and reduces the possibility of rising legality
serving as a “double-edged sword” that leads to political liberalization and robust protection of
337
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civil rights. 338 For these reasons, most scholars continue to characterize the Chinese regime as a
“rule by law” state—an increasingly nuanced and sophisticated one, perhaps—rather than a “rule
of law” one.
But it is also potentially much more than that, in the sense that legality is not merely something
that strengthens the Party-state’s political control, but also a condition that society now imposes
on the Party-state. The study of courts in authoritarian regimes has traditionally focused on the
relatively simple but fundamental question of why an authoritarian regime would accept any
modicum of judicial independence: what purpose does it serve? What function does it provide?339
The answers that scholars have given encompass both the top-down and the bottom-up, but rarely
both: some emphasize endogenous “supply-side” motivations for legal empowerment, in which
the regime pursues higher levels of local control, more effective dispute resolution, and stronger
economic growth; 340 whereas others prefer “demand-side” theories, in which private parties, both
domestic and foreign, demand judicial independence and professionalization for their own
reasons—and the government simply responds. 341
We have taken a more synthesized and fluid approach in this article, integrating both supply and
demand in a framework for understanding authoritarian judicial empowerment. Instead of a
relatively fixed “principal” making a rational decision to adopt, or not adopt, legal ordering at a
single point in time, the Chinese case provides an example of a dynamic set of calculations that
have been changing over time. Our argument is that there has been a strong path-dependency in
the regime’s use of law, even as its ideological justification and position has changed over time.
In this account, supply-side and demand-side factors mutually reinforce. Having sought to develop
a legal system for purposes of economic development and political control, the Chinese Party-state
has seen the use of law and legal forms of sociopolitical legitimation expand rapidly, such that
“turning away from law” is no longer really an option, either socially or administratively. 342 The
Party-state has indeed sought to steer the legal system to its own ends, but it is not merely a
principal directing the system. Instead, the system—once it has been embraced, both
instrumentally and ideologically, by private socioeconomic actors—has changed the Party-state as
much as the reverse, making it stronger and more resilient, and therefore creates the sociopolitical
conditions for its own reproduction and entrenchment.
Regardless of whether China was ever a “lawless” or “rule of man”-oriented society, 343 it is now,
by almost all indications, a highly legalistic one in which the great majority of people—including,
and especially, intellectual and political elites—both desire and increasingly assume a basic
political commitment towards law and rules-oriented governance and adjudication. Violating that
assumption carries sociopolitical costs of such magnitude, in terms of both instrumental
338
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inefficiency and ideological furor, that it is hard to imagine how the Party leadership could afford
to do so. Attempting to impose mediation or informal settlement on a population for whom
professional adjudication is a baseline expectation creates deep social confusion, higher economic
transaction costs, and serious administrative waste. Given the trajectory of Chinese legal and
social culture over the past century, the “political legitimacy bonus” of legal reform is already
enormous, and will almost certainly continue to grow into the foreseeable future. As noted above,
a pro-legality, “law and order”-oriented social culture is often self-reinforcing, placing heavy
pressure on the state, especially one that seems to be moving in a populist direction, to make
institutional reforms that further deepen the culture of legality, which then creates even stronger
incentives for the state to invest heavily, both rhetorically and actually, in judicial professionalism
and rules-based governance.
The only plausible reason for the Party leadership to reverse this trend now would be, as Liebman
suggests, a need for political stability: 344 a culture of legality might, for example, encourage the
general population to challenge the Party’s control, which might incentivize Party leaders to take
preventive measures before any such movements gets off the ground. This seems, however, like
a relatively remote possibility at the moment: as the strengthening of administrative litigation
indicates, the Party leadership seems perfectly happy to sacrifice some measure of administrative
flexibility in return for stronger adherence to legal rules by local officials, under the theory that
this will actually strengthen its legitimacy. 345 It clearly believes that legal investment reinforces,
rather than undermines, social support for the Party—and, moreover, that social demand for
legality can be disentangled from social demand for democracy, civil liberties, or “Western style
constitutional review.” 346 Xi’s robust personal popularity seems to suggest that, at least for now,
this assessment is correct.
This leads us to conclude that this trend towards legality is not easily reversed, nor likely to be.
For the somewhat foreseeable future—the next one or two decades of Xi Jinping’s rule, at least—
we expect the Chinese judiciary to become increasingly professional, independent, and powerful
and the Constitution to become more political salient and significant. As a result, we expect
everyday administration, law enforcement, and adjudication to become more rules-based, to the
extent that most individual interactions with the Party-state become regularized and predictable.
Civil liberties and political checks-and-balances within the Party leadership may very well
deteriorate over the same period, but they will probably do so in a formally legal manner. The
“turn towards law” under Xi is likely here to stay for the long term, bringing major political
benefits to both Xi himself and the Party-state in general, but we unfortunately see no reason why
legalistic authoritarian states are necessarily less oppressive for the common citizen than those in
which power is exercised in a more discretionary fashion.
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